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On the four-month trial in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,1 in the 151st District 
Court of Harris County, Texas during the summer and fall of 1985—which 
resulted in a $10.53 billion judgment for plaintiff Pennzoil Company and a 
corresponding $10.53 billion liability for defendant Texaco Inc.: 
Setting aside its relationship to reality, Pennzoil’s tale was a powerful and 
compelling one, mythological in scope and appeal.  Its details were vivid and 
neatly in place, reinforced by the oft-repeated themes of betrayal and honor 
drawled by [Pennzoil’s trial lawyer] from his first moment before the jury.2 
On Texas supersedeas laws immediately following the Pennzoil Co. v. 
Texaco Inc. judgment: 
An appellant who can not practicably post a supersedeas bond, but who could 
post other ad[e]quate security, perhaps non-liquid assets of a greater value 
than the bond would secure, may nonetheless have their property confiscated 
by execution pending appeal, an eventuality which might effectively preclude 
appellate access from the perspective of the appellant.  Such an appellant may 
be forced into bankruptcy or liquidation as a price for obtaining judicial 
review; a meaningful appeal is thus denied.3 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
The Texas civil justice system and business owners—particularly, owners 
of businesses that cannot readily remove $25 million from operations for 
several years—badly need further reforms to laws on superseding judgments 
awarding money.4  This need arises from the continuing dynamic of the 
now-infamous Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. case of the late 1980s.  Trial court 
proceedings may produce onerous money judgments that do not comport 
with business-world realities or that otherwise contain reversible error; 
consequently, the judgments demand appellate review.  However, such 
 
1. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., No. 84-05905, 1985 WL 1276957 (151st Dist. Ct., Harris 
County, Tex. Dec. 10, 1985). 
2. STEVE COLL, THE TAKING OF GETTY OIL 416 (1987). 
3. Elaine A. Carlson, Mandatory Supersedeas Bond Requirements—A Denial of Due Process Rights?, 
39 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 60 (1987). 
4. This paper addresses judgments “for recovery of money.”  TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(1).  It does 
not address or propose statutory amendments or procedural rule amendments for judgments for 
recovery of real or personal property, conservatorship or custody of minors or the disabled, judgments 
in favor of a governmental entity, or other judgments.  Id. R. 24.2(a)(2)–(5).  Judgments awarding money, 
more so than other types of civil judgments, frequently beset smaller Texas businesses and 
businesspeople, driving many to bankruptcy or other extreme financial measures. 
3
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review usually depends on the losers’ (the judgment debtors’) ability to 
supersede the onerous judgments.  If they cannot supersede such 
judgments, they lose meaningful appellate access—or gain it at too great a 
cost.   
By way of background, as part of 2003’s wide-sweeping civil justice 
reforms, Texas law began aiding judgment debtors (i.e., litigants liable under 
a civil judgment) while still protecting the rights to judgment security during 
an appeal for judgment creditors (i.e., litigants entitled to relief under a civil 
judgment).  Section 52.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the 
“statute”) and Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (the “procedural rule”) allow 
for judgment-suspension security, such as agreements between litigants, 
supersedeas bonds, cash deposits, or other security.5  The statute and 
procedural rule cap a judgment debtor’s burden; the debtor must provide 
security at the least of (i) the judgment amount (specifically, compensatory 
damages, post-judgment interest, and court costs), (ii) $25 million, or 
(iii) one-half of the debtor’s net worth.6  Further, both the statute and 
procedural rule forbid forms of security that cause “substantial economic 
harm” to a judgment debtor or that interfere with its use of assets “in the 
normal course of business.”7  The 2003 reforms to the statute, and the 
revisions to the procedural rule that followed, are commendable—they have 
protected the interests of businesses and businesspeople in the Texas civil 
justice system for over sixteen years. 
Since House Bill 4’s passage in 2003, the statute and procedural rule, as 
well as the case law construing them, openly promote the policy of allowing 
a judgment debtor to provide security in a flexible, reasonable manner—to 
avoid financial hardship to the debtor and to assure its rights to an appeal.8  
 
5. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(a) (addressing the amount of security for 
money judgments); TEX. R. APP. P. 24 (discussing the “suspension of enforcement of judgment 
pending appeal in civil cases”). 
6. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 52.006(b). 
7. Id. § 52.006(c); TEX. R. APP. P. 24. 
8. See generally Elaine A. Carlson, Reshuffling the Deck: Enforcing and Superseding Civil Judgments on 
Appeal After House Bill 4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2005) (“[In 2003] [t]he legislature made sweeping 
changes to Chapter 52 [of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code], making the posting of alternate security 
to suspend judgment enforcement on appeal substantially easier for the judgment loser, reflecting a new 
balance between the judgment creditor’s right in the judgment and the dissipation of the judgment 
debtor’s assets during the appeal against the judgment debtor’s right to meaningful and easier access to 
appellate review.”).  “Amendments promulgated in 2003 to Appellate Rule 24 further ease the burden 
of obtaining an order of lesser security to suspend judgment enforcement.  Legislative provisions were 
enacted to offer a judgment debtor additional flexibility to post security to suspend execution.”  See id. 
at 1069 (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 52.006). 
4
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Directly addressing 2003’s promulgation of Section 52.006, the Texas 
Supreme Court observed these “changes in supersedeas may be seen as 
more protective of debtors, consistent with deep, populist Texas traditions.  
They may also be seen as respecting the importance of the right to a 
meaningful appeal.  Either way, first the Court, and then the Legislature, 
have deliberately made supersedeas more easily available.”9 
Despite the improvements to Texas supersedeas practice since 2003, 
many serious problems remain—particularly for small-to-medium sized 
businesses, or businesspeople, which need to pursue an appeal but are 
unable to deposit the requisite cash or obtain a supersedeas bond.  Business 
litigants routinely face large Texas judgments that well exceed $25 million 
or one-half of their net worth.  Understandably, they seek to appeal such 
judgments, which often contain numerous reversible errors or, at a 
minimum, require some appellate oversight.  The problem appears most 
severely for so-called “land rich, cash poor” business litigants—those having 
substantial real estate holdings such as land, farms, buildings, and oil and gas 
interests, but having relatively less cash or cash equivalents.  Many smaller 
Texas businesses and businesspeople are land rich, but are also cash poor.  
Consequently, they run a substantial risk of encountering the worst 
problems under Texas’s existing supersedeas laws in the event they become 
losing defendants in civil litigation. 
As a general rule, Texans do not give up fighting once they perceive that 
they have suffered an injustice.  They fight hard; when necessary, they fight 
to the bitter end.  Accordingly, business litigants in the Texas civil justice 
system that face sizeable judgments will pursue appeals—in search of full or 
partial relief—despite their inability to readily supersede a money judgment.  
The lengthy experience of the author and Texas case law are replete with 
examples of Texas business litigants fighting a judgment on appeal, while 
simultaneously fighting to preserve their hard-earned assets from judgment-
collection efforts by judgment creditors. 
 
9. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 359 n.27 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (“These 
changes to appellate security reform are intended to facilitate appellate access and provide relief to 
judgment debtors facing insolvency as the only option to avoid judgment execution or to those with a 
judgment so large that the cost of supersedeas, in the full amount of the judgment, would effectively 
inhibit their ability to appeal.” (citing Elaine A. Carlson, Tort Reform: Redefining the Role of the Court and the 
Jury, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 280 (2005)); Carlson, supra note 3, at 49 (speaking to the pre-reform 
supersedeas framework and noting “a mandatory supersedeas requirement in the amount of a money 
judgment to stay execution in some instances creates an unreasonable condition impairing the 
constitutional right of judicial access”). 
5
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This fighting on two fronts—to win the merits on appeal, and to preserve 
a life’s work from collections10—leads to tremendous strife, economic 
waste, opportunity cost, and satellite litigation.  The fighting only wastes 
time and resources; it benefits absolutely no one—other than plaintiff’s 
attorneys aggressively applying financial pressure on a business litigant to 
force a settlement before an appellate court has an opportunity to review the 
case’s merits.11  In the majority of cases, the fighting does not benefit the 
clients represented by such plaintiff’s attorneys.12 
This paper explores in detail the most prevalent problems under Texas’s 
existing supersedeas laws while proposing remedies to those problems by 
way of either legislative amendments to Section 52.006 or new case law 
development.  The paper proposes turning the largest detriments facing 
business litigants—namely, (i) sizeable judgment liability and (ii) being land 
rich and cash poor—into sizeable advantages.  The author has not 
conceived of any of the four remedies by way of pure thought devoid of 
practical experience; rather, he has applied the suggestions of accounting 
professionals or has carried to logical conclusion an existing trend under 
Texas case law. 
First and foremost, Texas law should recognize a judgment liability as a 
balance-sheet liability for the judgment debtor, which will substantially 
lessen the one-half-of-net-worth amount of judgment security that a 
business litigant must provide to supersede a money judgment.  For reasons 
that conflict with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, several Texas 
appellate courts have refused to recognize a judgment liability as a balance-
sheet liability.  The judgment liability can harass and beset the business 
litigant more so than any other liability on its balance sheet.  Yet, Texas law 
ironically does not allow this very real liability to lessen the litigant’s net-
worth determination.  A change here is of paramount importance to aiding 
smaller Texas businesses and businesspeople facing large money 
 
10. The fighting to preserve a life’s work from collections occurs either by resisting collection 
efforts with litigation or by providing judgment security under supersedeas laws.  In either scenario, 
the smaller business litigant expends a tremendous amount of money and other resources. 
11. This observation about plaintiff’s attorneys is entirely descriptive and does not implicate 
normative ethics.  Under the supersedeas laws that this Paper addresses, such attorneys have great 
economic incentives to apply financial pressure on opponents in order to achieve settlements, when 
and wherever possible. 
12. These clients would benefit more from supersedeas in the form of “alternate security,” as 
discussed in this paper.  See infra Part III.B. 
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judgments—and to aligning Texas law with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles. 
Second, Texas law should provide a judgment debtor with an absolute 
right to provide “alternate security” to the more traditional and considerably 
more expensive options: a bond or a cash deposit in lieu of bond.  A Texas 
business litigant holding substantial real property such as commercial 
buildings, farmland, or oil and gas interests should be able to give a security 
interest on that property (for instance, by way of a deed of trust13) in favor 
of the judgment creditor, while still managing the property and collecting 
earnings from it during the appeal.  Or, a Texas business litigant holding 
substantial personal property such as livestock, farm equipment, common 
stock, or interests in closely held companies should be able to give security 
interests under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)14 on that property 
in favor of the judgment creditor, while retaining the personalty and 
collecting earnings from it during the appeal.  Currently, a business litigant 
can provide such alternate security only upon obtaining a trial court’s 
permission.  Trial courts frequently do not grant permission.15  Challenging 
the trial court’s decision on appeal is fraught with expense and uncertainty—
because the appeal steers right into challenging the trial court’s use of 
“discretion.”16 
 
13. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 51.0001–.016 (detailing substantive rights and procedures 
for transactions involving deeds of trusts and other liens on realty). 
14. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101–.809 (detailing substantive rights and 
procedures for transactions involving security interests in personalty). 
15. After witnessing a judgment debtor’s loss on the merits during a trial or in a hearing, some 
trial courts might not exercise discretion necessary to aid a judgment debtor’s supersedeas efforts.  
Further, some trial courts are simply too busy to consider and consequently oversee the alternative, 
less traditional procedures for easing a judgment debtor’s supersedeas efforts.  Additionally, some trial 
courts abide by the traditional practice of allowing the judgment creditor—the victor on the merits—
to assume control over the post-judgment side of the case, including control over judgment collection 
and supersedeas issues.  Regardless, for whatever reason, many trial courts do not exercise discretion 
in making post-judgment rulings that could ease supersedeas issues for the judgment debtor. 
16. For decades, Texas law has trended strongly towards allowing trial courts to use their 
“discretion” without appellate interferences or disruptions, particularly as to factual determinations, 
rulings that settle disputed facts, and decisions involving mixed questions of law and fact.  See Walker 
v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing the Texas Supreme Court’s 
use of the writ of mandamus to correct clear abuses of discretion by trial courts since the 1950s). 
The test for an abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts 
present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action, but “whether the court acted without 
reference to any guiding rules and principles.”  The trial court’s ruling should be reversed only if 
it was arbitrary or unreasonable. 
7
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Third, Texas law should allow a redetermination of the amount of 
judgment security the judgment debtor must provide when an intermediate 
appellate court reduces the liability under the original judgment.  Currently, 
business litigants seeking further review in the Texas Supreme Court or 
United States Supreme Court17 experience months or years of appellate 
work while providing security under a reversed or reduced trial court 
judgment. Business litigants may reduce their judgment-security burdens 
during an appeal only upon obtaining a trial court’s permission, which is 
discretionary.  Once a trial court uses its discretion to deny the judgment-
amount redetermination, challenging the trial court’s decision on appeal is 
fraught with expense and uncertainty. 
Fourth, Texas law should allow a judgment debtor to subordinate or 
remove any judgment-related liens (such as abstracts of judgment) that are 
pending on the debtor’s real property so that the debtor may use such 
property for sales (to raise cash for a supersedeas deposit) or as collateral (to 
support a supersedeas bond).  Currently, business litigants can subordinate 
or remove judgment-related liens only upon obtaining a trial court’s 
permission.  Trial courts may not grant the permission at their discretion.  
Again, challenging any trial court’s discretionary ruling on appeal is fraught 
with expense and uncertainty. 
This paper explores and develops the legal, factual, and practical 
implications surrounding each of the four proposed reforms.  The 2003 
reforms to Texas supersedeas laws have served well the business community 
and commercial litigants; however, this paper’s four reforms are necessary 
to help those business litigants that fall into the interstitial spaces remaining 
since 2003. 
 
Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 
701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)). 
17. Although rare, appeals in civil cases involving money judgments can occur from Texas 
appellate courts to the United States Supreme Court.  See Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 1217, 1217 (1996) (“[P]etition for writ of certiorari is 
granted.  Judgment vacated and case remanded to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Seventh District, for 
further consideration in light of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore . . . .”)); Bischoff v. Austin, 
662 S.W.2d 156, 156–57 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 919 (1984) (involving an 
attempted appeal from the Austin Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court); Los 
Campeones, Inc. v. Valley Int’l Properties, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 
1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (involving an attempted appeal from the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals to the 
United States Supreme Court). 
8
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II.    THE PROBLEMS UNDER THE EXISTING SUPERSEDEAS LAWS 
This paper first must survey in some detail the various problems for small 
to medium-sized business defendants—here defined as businesses or 
business people unable to provide as judgment security (i) $25 million in 
cash, (ii) a supersedeas bond with a $25 million face value, or (iii) any other 
form of supersedeas under the statute and procedural rule, even when they 
possess substantial unencumbered assets that could serve as judgment 
security. 
A. The Acute Insensitivity of Present Supersedeas Laws for Smaller Business  
 Litigation Defendants, Particularly as They Are Found in Texas 
A judgment debtor may supersede the judgment to prevent the execution 
of a judgment while a case is on appeal.18  The laws addressing whether, 
when, and how a judgment debtor may supersede a judgment are called 
supersedeas laws.  In 2003, as part of a broad package of civil justice 
reforms, the Texas Legislature substantially reformed supersedeas laws, 
making them more favorable to a judgment debtor seeking to prevent 
judgment execution during an appeal.19  The legislature passed a bill 
(H.B. 4), which (among many civil-justice reforms) promulgated 
Section 52.006 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.20  Attempting to 
effect legislative intent and supplementing the Legislature’s new law with a 
procedural framework, the Texas Supreme Court, working with its Rules 
Advisory Committee, restructured Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.21  The 
Texas Supreme Court has supplemented and amended the current Rule 24 
in 2008 and in 2018.  Presently, Rule 24.1 outlines the four means for 
supersedeas pending an appeal: 
[A] judgment debtor may supersede the judgment by: (1) filing with the trial 
court clerk a written agreement with the judgment creditor for suspending 
enforcement of the judgment; (2) filing with the trial court clerk a good and 
sufficient bond; (3) making a deposit with the trial court clerk in lieu of a bond; 
or (4) providing alternate security ordered by the court.22    
 
18. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1. 
19. Carlson, supra note 8, at 1069. 
20. Id. at 1129. 
21. Id. at 1081. 
22. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a); Goggans v. Ford, No. 05-15-00052-CV, 2016 WL 2765033, at *2 
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that there are “four methods by 
9
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Despite the substantial and admirable 2003 reform efforts behind 
Section 52.006 and Rule 24, these supersedeas laws continue to 
disadvantage small-to-medium-sized business defendants.  The statute and 
procedural rule’s many substantive and procedural provisions do not enable 
a smaller business to readily supersede a judgment during an appeal and, 
under certain circumstances explained below, actually disadvantage both the 
judgment debtor and the judgment creditor by promoting the dissipation of 
judgment-debtor assets.23  Furthermore, the same substantive and 
procedural provisions provide strong economic incentives for collateral 
litigation (i.e., trial and appellate work over supersedeas issues) to the main 
appeal of a case. 
The statute and procedural rule’s central reform-related provisions are 
two “caps.”  A judgment debtor must provide judgment security to 
supersede a money judgment in the lesser amount of:  
(1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or 
(2) $25 million.24 
For instance, if a judgment debtor faced a $30 million judgment, and its 
“net worth” (i.e., assets less liabilities, as shown on a balance sheet) was 
$10 million, then the judgment debtor would need to post security of 
$5 million—one half of its net worth.  Alternatively, if a judgment debtor 
faced a $30 million judgment, and its net worth was $40 million, then the 
judgment debtor would need to post security of $20 million—one half of its 
net worth.  Finally, if a judgment debtor faced a $30 million judgment, and 
its net worth was $100 million, then the judgment debtor would need to 
post security of $25 million (the statutory cap)—which is less than one half 
 
which a judgment may be super[s]eded”).  Rule 24.1’s requirements are disjunctive—they are 
independent, alternative ways to supersede the judgment.  See City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc., 
463 S.W.3d 53, 58 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (“The statute’s use of ‘or,’ a disjunctive, identifies two 
alternative bases[.]”); Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42, 49 (Tex. 2015) (“This distinction 
between these two concepts is supported ‘by use of the disjunctive conjunction “or” between the two 
[words], which signifies a separation between two distinct ideas.’” (quoting Spradlin v. Jim Walter 
Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex. 2000))).  In other words, a party need not show an inability to 
obtain one type of supersedeas to utilize another method to supersede the judgment. 
23. In sum, the current law causes dissipation of judgment-debtor assets by over-emphasizing 
the usage of a traditional supersedeas bonds or hurried asset sales—both of which are inefficient and 
costly—instead of more economical means such as “alternate security.”  Furthermore, the current law 
creates incentives for parties to litigate heavily over supersedeas issues, which imposes litigation costs 
on both judgment debtors and creditors. 
24. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(1)–(2); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
10
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2019], No. 1, Art. 3
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol51/iss1/3
  
2019] SUPERSEDING MONEY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS 79 
of the $100 million in net worth and is less than the hypothetical $30 million 
judgment.  Under any scenario, Texas law, as expressed in intermediate 
court opinions, does not consider the judgment liability—here, a real and 
dangerous debt of $30 million—to be a liability for purposes of reducing 
the debtor’s judgment.25   
The judgment debtor posts security (whether it be $25 million or one half 
of net worth) most commonly by way of (i) a cash deposit in lieu of 
supersedeas bond or (ii) a supersedeas bond, each of which would be placed 
with the trial court clerk pending appeal.26  As for the bond, the process for 
obtaining one will prove to be expensive, tedious, and often prohibitive.  
First, the judgment debtor must provide sufficient collateral for a letter of 
credit from a reputable bank, then the judgment debtor must pay such bank 
several points over a prime rate per annum for the letter of credit.  Next, 
the judgment debtor must find a surety company willing to issue a 
supersedeas bond against the letter of credit.  Finally, the judgment debtor 
must pay the surety company a substantial per-annum fee for the bond.  The 
process can take several months, even when willing banks and surety 
companies are eagerly working to complete the transaction.  Moreover, 
rarely do banks and surety companies wish to accept such a transaction, 
which necessarily involves litigation risk. 
 
25. The Texas Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a judgment liability, as a balance-
sheet liability, would lessen a judgment debtor’s net worth.  However, several intermediate courts have 
concluded that a judgment liability does not lessen net worth.  See McCullough v. Scarbrough Medlin 
& Assocs., 362 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) 
(“[R]ule 24.2 specifically refers to the judgment debtor’s current net worth, which by definition does not 
include contingent assets or liabilities.  As this Court has previously stated, ‘the plain language of the 
statute [TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 52.006] does not include a contingent money judgment in 
calculating net worth.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Anderton v. Cawley, 326 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.))); see also O.C.T.G., L.L.P. v. Laguna Tubular Prods. Corp., 525 S.W.3d 
822, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, [mand. denied]) (“In light of the evidence before the 
trial court and absent any authority to the contrary, we cannot say the trial abused its discretion in 
excluding the judgment.”); Ashmore v. JMS Constr., No. 05-15-00537-CV, 2016 WL 4437009, at *2–
3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“On the record before this Court, we 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the two prior judgments as liabilities 
in determining Ashmore’s net worth.”); Business Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot Oil Serv., 392 S.W.3d 
183, 187–88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (per curiam) (“The trial court 
properly determined that because the judgment is a contingent liability it would not be included in the 
net worth calculation.”); Montelongo v. Exit Stage Left, Inc., 293 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.— 
El Paso 2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (refusing to view a judgment liability as a balance-sheet 
liability for purposes of determining net worth). 
26. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1. 
11
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Although a large, publicly-traded corporation may have the means to part 
with $25 million (as a cash deposit or as bond collateral) in order to 
supersede a substantial money judgment pending appeal, a smaller business 
defendant likely lacks the cash liquidity and financial wherewithal to do so.  
The $25 million deposit is insurmountable to the vast majority of business 
defendants in the Texas civil justice system.  This provision of the 2003 
reforms does not help most businesses in Texas that need to appeal a 
substantial money judgment. 
Likewise, capping judgment-suspension security at fifty percent of net 
worth does not help most businesses in Texas that need to appeal a civil 
judgment.  A typical Texas business defendant—such as a smaller oil 
producer, an agricultural business, a doctor in an urban area, or a home 
contractor—would have a net worth ranging from $1 million to $20 million.  
The same defendant’s net worth would depend heavily on some form of 
real estate: undeveloped land, farmland, commercial buildings, houses, or 
oil and gas interests.  The typical Texan civil defendant, in other words, has 
much more in the way of non-liquid real estate assets than cash or cash 
equivalents.   
Real estate assets often do not enable judgment debtors to meet the post-
2003 Texas requirements for superseding a civil judgment for the recovery 
of money.  Real estate assets are difficult to sell quickly in order to raise 
money for a cash deposit27—especially a sizeable cash deposit equaling one-
half of the business’s net worth. 
Also, although banks may take real estate collateral for purposes of 
ordinary business transactions, most banks are very resistant to taking such 
collateral for the unusual transaction of issuing a letter of credit to secure a 
supersedeas bond.  Most banks do not appreciate (or even wish to learn) the 
risk profile of a civil appeal.  Banks are very likely to decline outright a 
judgment debtor’s request for a letter of credit on real estate for purposes 
of a supersedeas bond. 
Further problems confront a judgment debtor attempting to use real 
estate assets to supersede a judgment.  The judgment creditors (plaintiffs) 
often obtain judgment liens, such as abstracts of judgment, on judgment 
 
27. A recent example of economic waste from a quick sale of real property appears in Cruz v. 
Ghani, No. 05-17-00566-CV, 2018 WL 6566642 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. 
op).  The judgment creditor, having obtained a writ of execution, had caused a levy sale of the debtor’s 
Fort Worth condominium on Tarrant County’s courthouse steps.  Id. at *23.  A fortunate buyer 
acquired the condominium for a mere $25,000, but the parties stipulated that its market value at the 
time of sale was $217,500.  Id. 
12
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debtors’ real estate assets.  Judgment debtors, consequently, must litigate in 
the trial court and appellate court whether such liens can be subordinated 
to the banks’ security interests for purposes of obtaining letters of credit.  
Otherwise, they must litigate whether such liens can be removed for 
purposes of a real estate sale.28  Also, the press or media exposure on a large 
jury verdict and civil judgment will dissuade real estate buyers, banks, and 
surety companies from entertaining any business from a judgment debtor 
seen as controversial or high-profile, even those with the willingness to 
conduct supersedeas business on real estate assets.  A great stigma attaches 
to a judgment debtor that has just lost a trial involving high-stakes dollar 
amounts. 
The statute’s and procedural rule’s central reform-related provisions 
often fail to help smaller businesses, as shown by these recent cases: 
Hardwick v. Smith Energy Co.,29 Cruz v. Ghani,30 and Stephens v. Three Finger 
Black Shale P’ship.31  Each case has experienced or is still experiencing 
supersedeas-related litigation that equals or exceeds the work on the appeal 
of the underlying case’s merits.   
Hardwick has seen a judgment debtor’s bankruptcy pending appeal even 
though the same judgment debtor later won virtually the entire appeal and 
thereby ridded himself of all significant monetary liability.  The judgment 
debtor first had to obtain a bankruptcy court’s permission to pursue his 
appeal in the Texas courts, which was ultimately quite successful.32  The 
helter-skelter nature of Texas state proceedings and bankruptcy proceedings 
resulted in the judgment debtor’s filing a malpractice lawsuit against some 
of his original trial counsel.  This malpractice action remained unresolved 
for several years. 
 
28. E.g., Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, No. 11-16-00177-CV, 2017 WL 3495390, 
at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (per curiam) (holding a trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing a judgment creditor’s request to subordinate judgment liens to security interests 
of a bank willing to provide a letter of credit for a supersedeas bond).  See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 52.011 (prescribing rules for when a judgment lien does not encumber real property). 
29. Hardwick v. Smith Energy Co., 500 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. granted, 
judgm’t vacated w.r.m.). 
30. Cruz v. Ghani, No. 05-17-00566-CV, 2018 WL 6566642 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2018, 
pet. filed) (mem. op.). 
31. Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, 580 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, 
no pet.). 
32. Before the appeal, Defendant Mark Hardwick faced a judgment liability of over 
$8.5 million; after the Amarillo Court of Appeals’ decision that liability had fallen to just $79,428.  
Hardwick, 500 S.W.3d at 478–79, 486–88. 
13
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Ghani 33 has seen the selling of a judgment debtor’s real property (a Fort 
Worth condominium) pending appeal, even though the same judgment 
debtor substantially prevailed on appeal.  As the Dallas Court of Appeals 
observed, 
[T]he judgment debtor] appealed, but did not supersede the judgment.  While 
[his] appeal was pending, [the judgment creditor] obtained a writ of execution 
and caused a condominium owned by [the judgment debtor] to be sold for 
$25,000.  After the execution sale, [the Dallas Court of Appeals] reversed the 
judgment on which execution issued.  On remand, [the judgment debtor] 
asserted a counterclaim for wrongful execution, which [the judgment creditor] 
generally denied.  The trial court rendered judgment that [the judgment 
debtor] recover $217,500, the stipulated fair market value of [the judgment 
debtor’s] condominium at the time of the execution sale, on his 
counterclaim.34 
Yet, multi-year litigation over the wrongful sale of the condominium must 
continue in light of the Dallas Court of Appeals’ reversal and remand on the 
$217,500 award.  The trial court now must entertain an evidentiary hearing 
on the condominium sale before determining whether the judgment debtor 
can recover its fair market value from the judgment creditor.35 
Stephens has seen at least as much supersedeas-related litigation as 
appellate work on the case’s merits, causing a tremendous wasting of assets 
for the judgment debtor to use for an appeal.  The wasting of assets harms 
the Stephens judgment creditors as well; in the event they prevail at the 
appeal’s conclusion, the expansive collateral litigation (which itself has 
resulted in two appeals to the Eastland Court of Appeals) caused this 
particular judgment debtor to expend $1.25–$1.5 million in assets in legal 
fees, supersedeas bond costs, and other transactional costs—which the 
judgment creditors can no longer collect. 
The recent examples of Hardwick, Cruz, and Stephens constitute a mere 
sampling of the strife, economic waste, satellite litigation, and collateral legal 
work engendered by the current supersedeas laws—whenever small 
business defendants cannot readily supersede judgments needing appellate 
correction. 
 
33. Mehrdad Ghani was the primary defendant and judgment debtor in Cruz v. Ghani.  
Therefore, this paper refers to the case as Ghani in order to highlight the judgment debtor’s viewpoint 
and rights in such civil litigation. 
34. Ghani, 2018 WL 6566642, at *23. 
35. Id. at *23–24. 
14
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B. The Problem with Trial-Court Discretion in Present Supersedeas Practice, 
and the Difficulty of Obtaining Appellate Relief 
Beyond the two central reform-related provisions of the statute and the 
procedural rule—that is, the two caps—three additional provisions of both 
the statute and the procedural rule seek to aid judgment debtors to achieve 
supersedeas pending appeal, and three provisions of the procedural rule 
(which do not appear in the statute) seek to aid judgment debtors to achieve 
supersedeas pending appeal.  These six other provisions—which function 
independently of the $25 million cap or the half-of-net-worth cap—fail to 
help most businesses in Texas that need to appeal a civil judgment.  Each 
of these provisions depends on or steers into “trial court discretion”—that 
is, an appellate court’s strong inclination to allow a trial court to help a 
judgment debtor to supersede a judgment without appellate interference.  
Consequently, to obtain assistance by way of one of the following six other 
provisions, the judgment debtor must convince the trial court—the very 
court that imposed a judgment on the judgment debtor—to take an 
extraordinary action for purposes of helping the judgment debtor.  Chances 
are slim the judgment debtor will obtain relief. 
First, both the statute and the procedural rule require a lesser amount of 
judgment security in the event the $25 million cap or the half-of-net-worth 
cap (whichever applies) presents “substantial economic harm” to the 
judgment debtor.36  Although the statute and procedural rule use mandatory 
language—“the trial court shall lower” or “must lower”—both give the trial 
court discretion not to lower the security required by the caps unless and until 
the trial court finds “substantial economic harm” to the debtor.  Using its 
powerful discretion, the trial court may conclude at will that the judgment 
debtor has suffered or will suffer no substantial economic harm and, thus, 
should not receive the benefits of a lesser amount of judgment security.37  
So much for the mandatory language “shall” and “must.” 
 
36. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(c) (“On a showing by the judgment 
debtor that the judgment debtor is likely to suffer substantial economic harm if required to post security 
in an amount required [by the caps], the trial court shall lower the amount of the security to an amount 
that will not cause the judgment debtor substantial economic harm.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(b) (“The 
trial court must lower the amount of security required [by the caps] to an amount that will not cause the 
judgment debtor substantial economic harm if, after notice to all parties and a hearing, the court finds 
that posting a bond, deposit, or security in the amount required [by the caps] is likely to cause the 
judgment debtor substantial economic harm.”). 
37. A trial court, which may already have shown its wariness of (or downright dislike of) a 
judgment debtor, has many facts under Texas law that it may use in order to find that no economic 
harm has occurred.  See Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905, 917 
15
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Challenging the trial court’s discretion on appeal—by showing that the 
judgment debtor has suffered substantial economic harm when a trial court 
has found otherwise—constitutes an expensive and nearly impossible task 
for the judgment debtor.  Struggling in an appellate court against the dense 
Texas case law that practically ensconces a trial court’s discretion typically 
results in failure for the judgment debtor.38 
Second, both the statute and the procedural rule forbid a trial court’s 
disruption of a judgment debtor’s handling of its assets “in the normal 
course of business.”39  The “normal course of business” protection is very 
limited; Section 52.006(e) applies the protection only in the narrow 
circumstance of curtailing a trial court’s injunctive orders that regulate asset 
dissipation/transference.  The protection, therefore, does not generally aid a 
judgment debtor unable to post security in the amount of $25 million or one-
 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (reviewing a judgment debtor’s claim of “substantial 
economic harm” by looking at “[h]ow much cash or other resources would it take to post a supersedeas 
bond in the amount in question?  Does the judgment debtor have sufficient cash or other assets on hand 
to post a supersedeas bond in this amount or to post a deposit in lieu of bond in this amount?  Does the 
judgment debtor have any other source of funds available?  Does the judgment debtor have the ability 
to borrow funds to post the requisite security?  Does the judgment debtor have unencumbered assets to 
sell or pledge?  What economic impact is such a transaction likely to have on the judgment debtor?  
Would requiring the judgment debtor to take certain action likely trigger liquidation or bankruptcy or 
have other harmful consequences?”). 
38. A small taste of this dense case law follows: 
The court of appeals reviews the trial court’s supersedeas rulings for an abuse of discretion.  
Id. at 909.  In general, “abuse of discretion” means the trial court acted “without reference to any 
guiding rules or principles.”  E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 
1995).  When a party, like a judgment debtor, attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an 
issue on which it had the burden of proof, it must show that the evidence establishes, as a matter of 
law, all vital facts in support of the issue.  Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).  
In reviewing such a matter-of-law challenge, the reviewing court first examines the record for evidence 
that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.  Id.  If there is no evidence to 
support the finding, the reviewing court then examines the entire record to determine if the contrary 
proposition is established as a matter of law.  Id.  The issue should be sustained if the contrary 
proposition is conclusively established.  Id.; see, e.g., Khorshid, Inc. v. Christian, 257 S.W.3d 748, 763-
64 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (establishing appellants’ amount of offset as a matter of law when 
their evidence was “uncontroverted”). 
39. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 52.006(e) (“Nothing in this section prevents a trial court from 
enjoining the judgment debtor from dissipating or transferring assets to avoid satisfaction of the 
judgment, but the trial court may not make any order that interferes with the judgment debtor’s use, 
transfer, conveyance, or dissipation of assets in the normal course of business.”); TEX. R. APP. 
P. 24.2(d) (“The trial court may enjoin the judgment debtor from dissipating or transferring assets to 
avoid satisfaction of the judgment, but the trial court may not make any order that interferes with the 
judgment debtor’s use, transfer, conveyance, or dissipation of assets in the normal course of 
business.”). 
16
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half of its net worth cap.  Finally, a trial court’s decision on the “normal 
course of business” protection falls under an “abuse of discretion” review, 
thus presenting all appellate difficulties surveyed above, to an aggrieved 
judgment debtor.40 
Third, both the statute and the procedural rule provide for broad 
appellate review of a trial court’s rulings on supersedeas issues, without the 
hindrance of mandamus procedures.41  However, such appellate review 
provides ersatz relief to a judgment debtor suffering from adverse rulings on 
supersedeas issues; the appeal invariably becomes a battle over trial-court 
discretion and, consequently, constitutes an expensive and nearly impossible 
task. 
The procedural rule provides three additional protections to a judgment 
debtor, beyond the $25 million cap or the half-of-net-worth cap.  These 
three additional protections do not appear in the statute.  First, the 
procedural rule proposes a practical protection, though not a legal right to 
protection: it proposes that the judgment debtor and judgment creditor may 
reach a “written agreement . . . for suspending enforcement of the 
judgment.”42  Accordingly, in the event the judgment debtor and judgment 
creditor wish to avoid costly supersedeas-related litigation, or in the event the 
judgment creditor wishes to avoid uncertainty and risk over collection efforts 
pending appeal,43 the parties may reach an agreement on supersedeas issues.  
 
40. See Nelson v. Vernco Constr., Inc., 367 S.W.3d 516, 521–22 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no 
pet.) (per curiam) (acknowledging that an “abuse of discretion” standard of review applies to trial-court 
decisions under § 52.006(e) and Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(d)). 
41. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 52.006(d) (“An appellate court may review the amount of security 
as allowed under Rule 24, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that when a judgment is for 
money, the appellate court may not modify the amount of security to exceed the amount allowed under 
this section.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a) (“A party may seek review of the trial court’s ruling by motion 
filed in the court of appeals with jurisdiction or potential jurisdiction over the appeal from the judgment 
in the case . . . .”). 
42. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(1); see generally Carlson, supra note 8, at 1070 (“Although it has long 
been the practice that judgment enforcement may be suspended by agreement of the parties, current 
Appellate Rule 24 expressly acknowledges the propriety and effectiveness of such private 
agreements. . . . To be enforceable, the agreement suspending enforcement of the trial court’s judgment 
must be in writing, setting forth the terms, and be signed by the parties or their counsel, and filed with 
the trial court.”). 
43. Judgment creditors have substantial incentives to proceed with asset collection on 
judgments that are not superseded.  But uncertainties and risks arise for any judgment creditor that has 
pursued such collections.  Namely, whenever a judgment creditor liquidates a judgment debtor’s assets 
and the final judgment is reversed or set aside, then the judgment creditor must compensate the debtor 
by paying the market value of liquidated assets at the time of sale/disposal.  See CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
§ 34.022(a)–(b) (“A person is entitled to recover from the judgment creditor the market value of the 
17
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For instance, they may agree that the judgment debtor would not 
dissipate/transfer assets pending appeal in exchange for the judgment 
creditor’s acceptance of less than the security defined by the $25 million cap 
or the half-of-net-worth cap.  But judgment debtors have no right to obtain 
agreements for posting security that is less than what the caps require, and 
they cannot appeal a judgment creditor’s refusal to enter such an agreement. 
Second, the procedural rule, but not the statute, provides that the trial 
court may order “alternate security” to an agreement by the parties, a 
supersedeas bond, or a cash deposit in lieu of bond.44  Nevertheless, the 
“alternate security” provision is nebulous and depends entirely on trial-court 
discretion, which presents all of the appellate difficulties to an aggrieved 
judgment debtor that are surveyed above.  A judgment creditor has no 
assurance that a trial court will accept “alternate security” in lieu of a bond 
or cash deposit in the amount required by the two caps.  The same judgment 
creditor has a negligible chance of success when challenging by appeal a trial 
court’s refusal to accept alternate security.  Indeed, a survey of published 
Texas cases reveals no discernable instances of the parties’ using alternate 
security over the more traditional means of superseding a judgment.45 
 
person’s property that has been seized through execution of a writ issued by a court if the judgment 
on which execution is issued is reversed or set aside but the property has been sold at execution.  The 
amount of recovery is determined by the market value at the time of sale of the property sold.”); 
Ziemian v. TX Arlington Oaks Apts., Ltd., 233 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d) 
(“[Section 34.022 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code] appears to presume an execution that was 
valid at the time it was made, followed by a change in circumstances that would make it unjust for the 
executing party to retain the value of the property seized.”); Cruz v. Ghani, No. 05-17-00566-CV, 
2018 WL 6566642, at *23 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evaluating a 
judgment debtor’s obtainment of a $217,500 market value award for a judgment creditor’s wrongful 
selling of the debtor’s condominium for a mere $25,000).  A judgment creditor wishing to avoid this 
potential liability must be mindful of the onerous consequences of collecting on a judgment that an 
appellate court ultimately reverses.  Such a creditor may seek to enter a Rule 24.1(a)(1) agreement with 
the judgment debtor. 
44. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(4). 
45. Since the promulgation of the new Rule 24 in 2003, few appellate courts have addressed 
exactly how a trial court should determine the adequacy of “alternate security”—that is, its specific type 
and amount—under Rule 24.1(a)(4).  The Texas Supreme Court in In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 
2006) (orig. proceeding), did not address 24.1(a)(4)’s alternate security provision, but did cite with 
approval to one of its pre-2003 cases holding that a judgment debtor could post $500,000 in bonds—
provided by his insurance carrier—in order to suspend a judgment exceeding $3.1 million.  See In re 
Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 
925 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding)) (“[R]eviewing by mandamus a trial court’s order 
permitting the judgment debtor to post alternate security to supersede execution of the judgment.”).  
The Houston Court of Appeals in Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C. in dicta, 
commented on a trial court’s and judgment creditors’ shared view that placing title to seven oil and gas 
18
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Lastly, the procedural rule, but not the statute, provides that the trial court 
retains continuing jurisdiction during the appeal in order to “modify the 
amount or type of security required to continue the suspension of a 
judgment’s execution”—“if circumstances change.”46  Whether a trial court 
modifies the amount or type of security in order to, for instance, require less 
security than the two caps require, depends entirely on trial-court discretion, 
which presents all of the appellate difficulties to an aggrieved judgment 
debtor that are surveyed above.47  In sum, a judgment creditor lacks a viable 
right to lower or alter the supersedeas requirements because of alleged (or 
firmly proven) changed circumstances.48 
C. Problems from the Finality of the Appellate Process: Superseding an Ersatz 
Judgment 
Often, business appellants will win a partial, but not yet final victory on 
appeal.  For instance, in the intermediate appellate court they may obtain a 
reversal of the majority of money damages that they owe, but further 
appellate litigation may lie ahead.  If any party seeks further review in the 
Texas Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court, the business 
appellants (as judgment debtors) must continue to supersede the original 
judgment from the trial court, despite having obtained an appellate decision 
substantially reducing their liability under that judgment.  The reasoning and 
authority of the leading commentator49 on Texas supersedeas law, along 
 
properties into the court’s registry could constitute adequate alternate security, but that the judgment 
debtors were not seeking judgment suspension by way of that particular security.  Ramco Oil & Gas, 
Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905, 919–20, 920 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 
2005, no pet.). 
46. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a)(2). 
47. See Haedge v. Cent. Tex. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, No. 07-15-00368-CV, 2016 WL 836084, at *2 
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 3, 2016, no pet.) (per curiam) (acknowledging the abuse of discretion 
standard for review of a trial court’s decisions in setting and modifying supersedeas amounts and 
conditions). 
48. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a)(2) (vesting the trial court with discretion to decide if changes in 
circumstances support modification of the amount or type of requisite security). 
49. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1105 (citing Rules of Appellate Procedure and concluding: 
“[T]here is no authority that empowers the trial court to order an increase or decrease in appellate 
security premised upon an appellate court judgment when that judgment is subject to further appellate 
review, and no mandate has issued.”).  “[T]he trial court judgment should remain the operative judgment 
until the appellate process is complete and a judgment is entered by the appellate court and the appellate 
court issues its mandate requiring recognition and enforcement of its judgment.”  id. at 1106.  Professor 
Carlson does offer hope to litigants seeking to convince a trial court to increase or decrease appellate 
security in light of an appellate court judgment that is subject to further review: she cites to an order in 
“Harris v. Archer, No. 07-01-0071-CV, at *3 (Tex. App.[—]Amarillo 2004, order) (unpublished).”  See 
19
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with the importance of “the mandate” in the Texas Rules of Appellate 
Procedure,50 require appellate litigants to supersede original judgments, 
despite their alteration during an appeal.  Presently, there is a lack of direct 
case law on the continuing obligation to supersede an original judgment that 
an appellate court has reduced (or increased).51 
After a victory at the court of appeals, a judgment debtor faces the 
potential for further appellate litigation before the Texas Supreme Court—
which takes many months or several years to conclude.  The parties may file 
successive motions for rehearing (reconsideration) in the intermediate 
appellate court under Rule of Appellate Procedure 49.52  The appellate 
court may take months to reevaluate its initial decision and, if necessary, to 
refine it by way of a new appellate opinion.  Unless the parties (or one of 
 
id. at 1106 n.410 (referencing the significance of Harris as an “instance in which an appellate court 
ordered the modification of the appellate security necessary to continue suspension of the enforcement 
of a judgment based upon the appellate modification of that judgement”).  Concerning Harris, none of 
this case’s accessible formats, as published or available on Westlaw or Lexis, addresses supersedeas issues 
or the unpublished order.  See Harris v. Archer, 134 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied); 
Harris v. Archer, No. 07-01-0071-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 10645 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 18, 
2003, opinion withdrawn); Harris v. Archer, No. 07-01-0071-CV, 2003 WL 22971129 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Dec. 9, 2003, no pet.).  This paper’s author has no doubt that Professor Carlson’s description 
of the unpublished order is accurate and correct; but Harris—as it is available to practitioners—does not 
aid litigants seeking to alter judgment security in the midst of an ongoing appeal. 
50. Professor Carlson references Rules of Appellate Procedure 24.1, 18.1(a)(1), 18.1(a)(2), 
24.1(c)(3), and 51.1(b) in support of her view that a trial court cannot increase or decrease appellate 
security in light of an appellate court judgment that is subject to further appellate review.  Carlson, supra 
note 8, at 1105–06.  Of these, the most supportive Rule for her view would be 51.1(b), which provides 
that “[w]hen the trial court clerk receives the mandate, the appellate court’s judgment must be enforced,” 
suggesting the trial court and clerk should not enforce the appellate judgment until mandate issues.  TEX. 
R. APP. P. 51.1(b).  Compare id. R. 24.3(a)(2) (“Even after the trial court’s plenary power expires, the trial 
court has continuing jurisdiction to do the following: . . . if circumstances change, modify the amount 
or type of security required to continue the suspension of a judgment’s execution.”), with Carlson, supra 
note 8, at 1106 (“An appealable judgment, which by its nature may not be enforced until completion of 
the appellate process, should not be considered a changed circumstance that would support the trial 
court modification of appellate security.”). 
51. Working from analogous cases, legal research will reveal cases in which an appellant litigant 
must abide by an original trial court judgment until the appellate process is complete and a mandate 
issues.  See, e.g., In re City of Cresson, 245 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, orig. proceeding) 
(correcting an appellant litigant, the City of Granbury, for taking actions during an ongoing appeal that 
were allowed by a trial court judgment, which had been superseded and which the appellate court had 
reversed: “[City litigant’s] admitted activities within the Disputed Tracts are in defiance of the status of 
the trial court’s judgment as superseded.  Accordingly, until the earlier of the issuance of mandate in 
[the trial court case] or the issuance of a contrary order or judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas, 
[city litigant] shall be restrained from asserting jurisdiction within the Disputed Tracts or otherwise 
acting as if its ordinances annexing the Disputed Tracts are valid . . . .”). 
52. TEX. R. APP. P. 49.1. 
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them) seeks an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the appellate court will 
issue a mandate to the trial court to enforce its decision, pursuant to Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 18.53  Issuance of the mandate routinely takes many 
weeks or even several months. 
Further delaying a mandate’s issuance, the parties may seek review in the 
Texas Supreme Court.  Seeking such review requires a two-step process.  
First, the parties (or one of them) must seek acceptance by the Court to 
review the case under the Petition for Review procedures of Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 53.54  This step may take months to complete; the 
Texas Supreme Court rarely decides to reject or accept an appeal within only 
a few weeks.  Second, if the Court accepts the appeal, the parties proceed to 
“full briefing” under Rule of Appellate Procedure 55.55  During or after full 
briefing, the court may reject the appeal.56  Or, the Court may take the 
briefing under consideration and elect to have oral argument.57  Conversely, 
the Court may consider the briefing and issue a decision without oral 
argument.58  After the court issues a decision, the parties may proceed to 
motions for rehearing in the Texas Supreme Court under Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 64.59  The foregoing appellate work in the Texas Supreme 
Court—for a case meriting that Court’s attention—can take many months 
or, more commonly, several years. 
During the months or years-long appellate work following an appellate 
victory that has reduced the judgment liability, the judgment debtor must 
continue to supersede the security amount demanded by the original 
judgment—despite the judgments having become a virtual fiction under the 
pending appellate decision.  The judgment debtor will incur the hefty costs 
of maintaining a supersedeas bond, or other supersedeas-related 
transactional costs, as the appeal continues. 
 
53. Id. R. 18.1. 
54. Id. R. 53.1. 
55. Id. R. 55.1. 
56. See id. R. 56.1(d) (allowing dismissal of an appeal in the Texas Supreme Court for an 
“improvident grant”). 
57. See, e.g., id. R. 58.7(b) (allowing for oral argument “either on a party’s request or on the Court’s 
own initiative”). 
58. See, e.g., id. R. 59.1 (“If at least six members of the Court so vote, a petition may be granted 
and an opinion handed down without oral argument.”). 
59. See, e.g., id. R. 64 (“A motion for rehearing may be filed with the Supreme Court clerk within 
15 days from the date when the Court renders judgement or makes an order disposing of a petition for 
review.”). 
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The debtor may argue to the trial court under Rule 24.3(a)(2) that changed 
circumstances compel a reduction of the security amount (alternatively, the 
judgment creditor may argue that changed circumstances compel increasing 
the amount, in the event an appellate decision has imposed greater liability 
upon the judgment debtor).60  The trial court may use its discretion to 
reduce (or increase) the security amount, and challenging that discretion on 
appeal is unlikely to alter the trial court’s decision.61 
D. Problems from Pending Judgment Liens Against Real Property: 
Encumbering the Assets Necessary for Supersedeas 
Texas business appellants often own substantial real-estate holdings, such 
as land, buildings, houses, or oil and gas interests, but may hold few liquid 
assets to secure a bond or make a cash deposit to supersede a money 
judgment.  Once they become judgment debtors, their opponents, the 
judgment creditors, frequently will file abstracts of judgment under 
Chapter 52 of the Property Code62 and will pursue writs of execution to 
force levy sales of their real estate holdings and personal property.63  
Abstracts and execution writs create judgment-related liens on real property 
relatively soon after a trial court renders judgment—quite often before 
judgment debtors can arrange for sales transactions to raise cash deposits, 
or before they can use their real estate as collateral for a bond. 
When a judgment debtor is forced to use real estate in order to supersede 
a judgment, the process of selling the same for cash or using it as bond 
collateral can take many months.  Banks, bond surety companies, and real 
estate buyers proceed very cautiously and very slowly when entering a 
transaction related to the landholder’s (the judgment debtor’s) underlying 
litigation.  Consequently, judgment creditors—eager to collect on a 
judgment or put financial pressure on judgment debtors—routinely beat 
 
60. See generally Carlson, supra note 8, at 1106 (“Until a final adverse judgment on appeal is 
rendered, the security continues to serve to supersede the trial court’s judgment.  An appealable 
judgment, which by its nature may not be enforced until completion of the appellate process, should not 
be considered a changed circumstance that would support trial court modification of appellate security.” 
(emphasis added)). 
61. See id. at 1059 (“The trial court continues to have the general discretion to ‘make any order 
necessary to adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might 
cause.’” (quoting Tex. R. App. P. 24.1(e))). 
62. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 52.001–.043 (providing substantive rights and procedures 
for judgment liens). 
63. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 621–22, 629–30, 637–39, 646a–50 (providing procedures for judgment 
execution, including levy sales). 
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banks, bond surety companies, and real estate buyers to the punch by 
becoming priority lien holders on judgment-debtor realty long before the 
others have even begun to act. 
Unless a judgment debtor can put a bank, surety company, or buyer in a 
first lien holder position, the debtor cannot use its real estate holdings in 
order to raise a cash deposit (after a sale) or to obtain a supersedeas bond 
(after a collateral transaction for a letter of credit).64  Abstracts of judgment 
and levy-sale liens (following writs of execution) put judgment creditors in 
a first lien holder position—effectively preventing the use of real estate for 
purposes of a cash deposit or a supersedeas bond.65 
Just as it may reject the use of real estate as “alternative security” under 
Rule 24.1(a)(4), the trial court under existing Texas law may use its discretion 
to reject the judgment debtor’s request for subordination or removal of 
judgment-related liens for supersedeas purposes.66  When this happens, a 
 
64. See Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, No. 11-16-00177-CV, 2017 WL 3495390, 
at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 23, 2017, no pet.) (acknowledging that “judgment-related liens have 
prevented [judgment debtors] from posting a supersedeas bond” because the bank that would issue 
the bond’s underlying letter of credit would not accept a lien holder position that was subordinate to 
the judgment creditor’s first lien holder positions). 
65. See Transcontinental Realty Inv’rs, Inc. v. Orix Capital Mkts. LLC, 470 S.W.3d 844, 847–48 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.) (“Under Texas law, an abstract of judgment, ‘when it is recorded 
and indexed . . . constitutes a lien on and attaches to any real property of the defendant, other than real 
property exempt from seizure or forced sale . . . that is located in the county in which the abstract is 
recorded and indexed.’” (quoting PROP. § 52.001)). 
66. Appellate litigation may arise from the trial court’s rejection of the request for judgment-
lien subordination or removal.  E.g., Stephens, 2017 WL 3495390, at *1 (holding trial courts may use 
their discretion to refuse to suspend the judgment based on alternate security).  Only one statute 
addresses the circumstance under which a judgment debtor can obtain the subordination or release of 
the judgment lien; the statute makes the lien a nullity if the judgment debtor, first, “has posted security 
as provided by law or is excused by law from posting security” and, second, upon the trial court’s 
finding that “the creation of the lien would not substantially increase the degree to which a judgment 
creditor’s recovery under the judgment would be secured when balanced against the costs to the 
defendant after the exhaustion of all appellate remedies.”  PROP. § 52.0011(a)(1)–(2) (prescribing rules 
for when a judgment lien does not encumber real property).  The first circumstance does not aid the 
judgment debtor who cannot post security for one or more of the various reasons addressed by this 
paper: (i) being land rich, but cash poor; (ii) being unable to make a $25 million deposit in lieu of 
supersedeas bond; (iii) being unable to post security at one-half of net worth; (iv) being unable to post 
“alternate security”; and (v) being unable to obtain the trial court’s leniency on supersedeas matters.  
The second circumstance entails a nebulous balancing test—conducted by the trial court, which may 
be hostile to the judgment debtor—between “the degree to which a judgment creditor’s recovery under 
the judgment would be secured” and “the costs to the defendant after the exhaustion of all appellate 
remedies.”  PROP. § 52.0011(a)(2).  The second circumstance, therefore, hurls the judgment debtor 
into trial-court discretion, with all attendant uncertainties and costs.  Making matters worse, some 
Texas cases hold that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review trial court orders under the statute.  
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judgment debtor must appeal the trial court’s decision under an abuse-of-
discretion standard, with all of the appellate uncertainty surrounding a 
challenge to a trial-court discretion.67 
III.    PROPOSED REFORMS TO SECTION 52.006, 
OR NEW CASE-LAW CONSTRUCTIONS FOR IT 
Below are four proposed reforms to Texas supersedeas laws for the 
benefit of small to medium-sized business defendants.  All four reforms 
would begin first with an amendment to the existing text of Section 52.006.  
Then, working with the Rules Advisory Committee, the Texas Supreme 
Court would amend the existing Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 to reflect 
amendments to the statute. 
Alternatively, the Texas Supreme Court or courts of appeals could 
implement the reforms urged by this paper by way of case law.  However, 
creating or shaping law by means of case development is gradual and 
meandering, at best—requiring good opportunities (cases involving the 
appropriate facts and context) and good appellate lawyering (specifically, 
lawyers prepared to argue vigorously for this paper’s reforms and lawyers 
prepared to argue just as vigorously against them) so that appellate courts 
benefit from a strong adversarial process.68  The problems of case law 
development become even more challenging with technical, procedural 
points of law, such as those appearing in the proposed reforms below.69  
Those courts that have ruled contrary to the first reform below,70 which 
 
See, e.g., Transcontinental Realty, 470 S.W.3d at 847–48 (addressing Section 52.0011 and rejecting the 
judgment debtor’s argument that “the power conferred on appellate courts by [S]ection 52.006 of the 
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and rule 24.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
review the amount and type of security required to suspend enforcement of judgment provides an 
independent basis for appellate jurisdiction”). 
67. See Stephens, 2017 WL 3495390, at *1 (“The record indicates that the real property upon 
which the judgment creditors have obtained judgment liens and have begun execution is the only means 
available to the [judgment debtors] to supersede the judgment . . . .  [W]e believe that the trial court 
abused its discretion when it refused to enter an order to subordinate the judgment liens or release the 
abstracts of judgment as necessary to permit the [judgment debtors] to supersede the judgment while, 
at the same time, protecting the judgment creditors.”). 
68. Cf. PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 90 (Tex. 
2004) (avoiding substantive-law rulings that could “skew[] the adversarial process” in future cases); 
Pease v. Principal Residential Mortg., Inc., No. 03-02-00491-CV, 2004 WL 1065639, at *10–11 (Tex. 
App.—Austin May 13, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (praising the adversarial process for purposes of 
testing facts). 
69. See infra Part III. 
70. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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proposes allowing a judgment liability to lessen net worth, and the court that 
has ruled contrary to the second reform,71 which proposes an absolute right 
for alternate security, would have to grapple with the stare decisis effects of 
their prior opinions.72  Additionally, all Texas appellate courts, including the 
highest court, would have to reconsider allowing trial courts to have as much 
discretion as they currently have to resolve supersedeas issues; as explained 
earlier, trial-court discretion can prevent defendants from benefitting from 
several 2003 supersedeas reforms.73  Therefore, this paper advocates for 
statutory reform in a future Texas legislative session over case law 
development—although the paper below references potential areas for case-
law development when appropriate. 
For each of the reforms below, the paper already has described the 
underlying problem for which the reform is a remedy.74  However, the 
paper gives more substantial attention to and writing on the first reform—
the deeming of a judgment liability to be a balance-sheet liability.  The paper 
must explain the accounting background for the underlying problem, and 
the accounting profession’s viewpoint on this problem—which is quite 
different from, but superior to, Texas law’s existing viewpoint. 
 
71. The Eastland Court of Appeals, before its opinion in Stephens, issued an order denying the 
judgment debtor’s request to provide alternate security under Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1(a)(4).  
See Stephens, 2017 WL 3495390, at *1 (“On October 27, 2016, this court previously denied movants’ 
first motion for review under Rule 24.4, in which movants sought to post real property as alternate 
security.”). 
72. Texas appellate courts, of course, can and do overrule their earlier decisions or modify them 
significantly; however, they must remain cognizant of the policy reasons underlying stare decisis and 
the law’s presumption in favor of settled case law.  See generally Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 
320–21 (Tex. 1995) (“Of course, we have, on occasion and for compelling reasons, overruled our 
earlier decisions . . . .  Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and 
legitimacy.  First, if we did not follow our own decisions, no issue could ever be considered resolved.  
The potential volume of speculative relitigation under such circumstances alone ought to persuade us 
that stare decisis is a sound policy.  Secondly, we should give due consideration to the settled 
expectations of litigants . . . who have justifiably relied on the principles articulated in [settled case law].  
Finally, under our form of government, the legitimacy of the judiciary rests in large part upon a stable 
and predictable decisionmaking process that differs dramatically from that properly employed by the 
political branches of government.” (citations omitted)); Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 
1979) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis does not stand as an insurmountable bar to overruling precedent.  
Stare decisis prevents change for the sake of change; it does not prevent any change at all.  It creates a 
strong presumption in favor of the established law; it does not render that law immutable.  Indeed, the 
genius of the common law rests in its ability to change, to recognize when a timeworn rule no longer 
serves the needs of society, and to modify the rule accordingly.”). 
73. See supra Part II.B. 
74. See supra Part II. 
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A. Proposed Reform No. 1: Include the Civil Judgment as an Existing Liability  
for Purposes of Determining “Net Worth,” as Generally Accepted  Accounting 
Principles Prescribe 
Allowing a judgment debtor to post security at fifty percent of the 
judgment debtor’s net worth is one of the central provisions in the statute 
and procedural rule’s 2003 reforms.  The procedural rule provides a 
comprehensive procedure for when and how a judgment debtor proves its 
“net worth” for purposes of calculating fifty percent of the same.  First, “net 
worth is calculated as the difference between total assets and total liabilities 
as determined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).”75  A 
judgment debtor providing a bond, deposit, or security under 
Rule 24.2(a)(1)(A) must simultaneously file an affidavit that states the 
debtor’s net worth and states complete, detailed information concerning the 
debtor’s asset and liabilities from which net worth can be ascertained.76  The 
affidavit is prima facie evidence of the debtor’s net worth.77 
Next, a judgment creditor may file a contest to the debtor’s affidavit of 
net worth.78  At the hearing on the judgment creditor’s contest, the 
judgment debtor has the burden of proving net worth.79  The trial court is 
required to issue an order that states the debtor’s net worth and states with 
particularity the factual basis for that determination.80 
Finally—as with most contested decisions over supersedeas issues—an 
appellate court reviews the trial court’s net worth determination under an 
abuse of discretion standard.81  An aggrieved judgment debtor, hoping to 
revise down its net worth by appeal, stands little chance of success.82 
Presumably, requiring a judgment debtor to post security at fifty percent 
of net worth would burden the debtor less than requiring it to post security 
at one hundred percent of net worth, the full judgment amount, or at $25 
million (the other “cap” amount).  In certain cases, the lessened burden 
would certainly occur: for instance, if the judgment were for $30 million, 
 
75. Texas Custom Pools, Inc. v. Clayton, 293 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no 
pet.); G.M. Houser, Inc. v. Rodgers, 204 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). 
76. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(c)(1). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. R. 24.2(c)(2). 
79. Id. R. 24.2(c)(3). 
80. Id. 
81. Clayton, 293 S.W.3d at 305; Rodgers, 204 S.W.3d at 840. 
82. See, e.g., O.C.T.G., L.L.P. v. Laguna Tubular Prods. Corp., 525 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. 
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (providing another example of an appellate court’s refusal 
to disrupt a trial court’s discretion on a net-worth determination). 
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and the debtor’s net worth was $500,000, then the debtor would benefit 
greatly from posting security at $250,000 instead of either $30 million or 
$25 million. 
However, requiring security at fifty percent of net worth does not benefit 
a judgment creditor whose assets consist primarily of real estate or other 
non-cash holdings, against which banks will not readily issue letters of credit 
to support supersedeas bonds.  Further, even for a relatively low net-worth 
valuation—such as the foregoing $250,000 example—most banks hesitate 
to enter any financing transaction involving litigation risk, such as an appeal 
of a civil judgment.  Even banks that are normally comfortable with real 
estate-based financing become quite resistant to any financing transaction 
involving the risks of litigation or appeals. 
A trial court, which may be hostile to the judgment debtor, holds almost 
complete control over the net worth determination.  A trial court—having 
just rendered a substantial judgment against the judgment debtor—often 
presents tremendous net worth-related challenges for the smaller business 
defendant seeking to supersede a judgment pending appeal. 
One solution to the onerous net worth cap utilizes GAAP’s very 
definition of “net worth”—which is the legal standard under the statute and 
the procedural rule.83  GAAP defines “net worth” by working from the 
accounting perspective on a “balance sheet”—the proverbial left side of 
which shows a business’s total asset holdings, and the right side of which, 
which must “balance” (i.e., equal) the total asset value, shows the business’s 
total liabilities and total equity.84  “[A] balance sheet, sometimes referred to 
 
83. See Clayton, 293 S.W.3d at 305 (indicating that pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2 
“[n]et worth is calculated as the difference between total assets and total liabilities as determined by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)”); see also Business Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot Oil 
Serv., 392 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (per curiam) 
(stating net worth is “calculated as the difference between total assets and total liabilities as determined 
by [GAAP].”); Anderton v. Cawley, 326 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, orig. proceeding 
[mand. denied]) (using the GAAP definition to calculate net worth); Montelongo v. Exit Stage Left, Inc., 
293 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.) (holding Texas law follows the GAAP 
definition of net worth for purposes of the statute, the procedural rule, or both). 
84. DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 65–67, 183 (12th ed. 2007).  
Many Accountants speak of the balance sheet, which they reference more formally as the statement of 
financial position, in terms of its “right side” and “left side”—a remnant from days when accountants 
prepared a document with a horizontal (or landscape) formatting from a business’s general ledger.  Old 
style balance sheets, or even modern ones printed from accounting software, often show on the left 
side the total assets, and on the right side the total liabilities and total equity.  The two sides must 
balance because assets (the left side) must equal liabilities and equity (the right side).  See generally id. 
at 64 (“Increases to all asset and expense accounts occur on the left (or debit side) and decreases on the 
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as the statement of financial position, reports the assets, liabilities and 
[owner’s] equity of a business enterprise at a specific date.”85  A balance 
sheet reveals a person’s or entity’s net worth by utilizing the accounting 
formula of assets minus liabilities equal equity—that is to say, assets minus 
liabilities equal net worth.86 
As can happen, the law’s treatment of a business transaction or event can 
differ substantially from the business world’s treatment of the same 
transaction or event.  Here, the business world, best embodied by the 
principles in GAAP, treats judgment liabilities very differently from Texas 
law.87  GAAP accounting does not view a civil judgment liability—especially 
one on the cusp of enforcement—as an improbable, vague, or remote 
liability.  GAAP accounting does not view a civil judgment liability as 
unworthy of inclusion on the balance sheet, as several Texas intermediate 
courts of appeals have.  Rather, GAAP accounting puts the liability on the 
balance sheet and, accordingly, lessens the judgment debtor’s overall net 
worth.88 
 
right (or credit side).  Conversely, increases to all liability and revenue accounts occur on the right (or 
credit side) and decreases on the left (or debit side).”). 
85. Id. at 170. 
86. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 8, at 1081 (“The classic textbook definition of net worth is assets 
less liabilities.”); Balance Sheet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “balance sheet” to 
mean “[a] statement of financial position of any economic unit, disclosing as at a given moment of time, 
the value of its assets, liabilities, and equity of the owners in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles”); Net Worth, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “net worth” to 
mean “[t]he excess of total assets over total liabilities.”). 
87. Compare supra note 25 and accompanying text, with 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) for 
Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 20, 2019), at 33 (“Johnson & Johnson and certain of its subsidiaries are 
involved in various lawsuits and claims regarding product liability, intellectual property, commercial and 
other matters; governmental investigations; and other legal proceedings that arise from time to time in 
the ordinary course of business.  The Company records accruals for loss contingencies associated with these 
legal matters when it is probable that a liability will be incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.  
The Company has accrued for certain litigation matters and continues to monitor each related legal issue 
and adjust accruals for new information and further developments in accordance with Accounting 
Standards Codification (ASC) 450-20-25 [a GAAP rule, discussed infra Part III.A.2].” (emphasis added)).  
See also 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) for Exxon Mobil Corp. (Feb. 27, 2019), at 62 (“A variety of 
claims have been made against the Corporation and certain of its consolidated subsidiaries in a number 
of pending lawsuits. . . .  The Corporation accrues an undiscounted liability for those contingencies where the 
incurrence of a loss is probable, and the amount can be reasonably estimated. . . .  The Corporation revises such 
accruals in light of new information.  For contingencies where an unfavorable outcome is reasonably 
possible and which are significant, the Corporation discloses the nature of the contingency and, where 
feasible, an estimate of the possible loss.” (emphasis added)). 
88. See supra note 87; KIESO ET AL., supra note 84, at 64 (noting that “increases to all liability and 
revenue accounts occur on the right (or credit side) and decreases on the left (or debit side),” effectively 
decreasing net equity). 
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Indeed, the judgment debtor would be committing fraud and securities-
laws violations in the business world if it failed to disclose to creditors, 
banks, auditors, shareholders, or business partners the judgment’s nature 
and severity as a true liability, or if it failed to include the liability as a balance-
sheet liability.89  The judgment debtor’s attorneys with knowledge of the 
judgment liability have weighty ethical responsibilities to disclose the liability 
to a company’s auditors when asked and to encourage the company to 
disclose the liability fully to directors, shareholders, other stakeholders, and 
regulatory officials for reporting purposes.90 
Texas law’s refusal to acknowledge a judgment liability as a balance-sheet 
liability, or even to inform trial-court discretion on whether this liability 
should go on the balance sheet, conflicts greatly with GAAP viewpoint and 
practice.  A more sensible practice would be to include judgment liabilities 
on balance sheets, thereby lessening judgment debtors’ net worths by them. 
1. A Judgment Liability Is Not So “Contingent” to Merit Exclusion 
from a Judgment Debtor’s Balance Sheet 
By operation of common law, Texas law excludes from the net-worth 
calculation the actual judgment that the judgment debtor is appealing.  This 
common law results from the decisions of several intermediate Texas 
appellate courts.91  The Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.92 
 
89. Indeed, a publicly traded company under audit must disclose on a balance sheet even 
unasserted possible legal claims.  See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, § 9337, at 2027 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants 1975) (“[T]he ABA Statement of Policy [section 337C] and the understanding between 
the legal and accounting professions assumes that the lawyer, under certain circumstances, will advise 
and consult with the client concerning the client’s obligation to make financial statement disclosure 
with respect to unasserted possible claims or assessments.”). 
90. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 12, § 337C, at 2003 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1975). 
(“Independent of the scope of his response to the auditor’s request for information, the lawyer, 
depending upon the nature of the matters as to which he is engaged, may have as part of his 
professional responsibility to his client an obligation to advise the client concerning the need for or 
advisability of public disclosure of a wide range of events and circumstances.  The lawyer has an 
obligation not knowingly to participate in any violation by the client of the disclosure requirements of 
the securities laws.  In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer also may be required under the Code of 
Professional Responsibility to resign his engagement if his advice concerning disclosures is disregarded 
by the client.”). 
91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
92. Additionally, federal jurisprudence is unhelpful.  Unlike Texas law, a debtor’s “net worth” 
does not necessarily play a role in setting judgment security under federal law, and federal courts have 
not addressed whether the judgment liability itself lessens such net worth.  See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 208 F. 
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The intermediate courts addressing the issue have concluded that a civil 
judgment is a “contingent” liability93—that is, a liability that is less inevitable 
and ascertainable than, for instance, a notes payable for bank debt or an 
accounts payable to a trade creditor, which are very common liabilities for 
most businesses.  As a contingent liability, these courts have concluded, the 
judgment would not appear on a balance sheet’s proverbial right side so as 
to lessen overall net worth.94  One intermediate court went on to allow a 
trial court to assess the contingent nature of a judgment liability, suggesting 
that a trial court could have concluded that the judgment liability was so 
inevitable and ascertainable that it should lessen net worth—as do other 
liabilities.95  But, there is no reported decision in which a trial court has 
concluded that a judgment liability should go onto a balance sheet so as to 
lessen overall net worth.  All published decisions, rather, have allowed the 
 
Supp. 2d 1279, 1282–83 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (considering a judgment creditor’s “net worth” under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 62: “The usual requirement is that a party seeking a stay pending appeal post 
a full security supersedeas bond.  Departure from this rule will be made only in ‘extraordinary 
circumstances,’ where the moving party ‘objectively demonstrate[s] the reasons for such a departure’” 
(quoting Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 
1979)). 
93. See McCullough v. Scarbrough Medlin & Assocs., 362 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“[R]ule 24.2 specifically refers to the judgment debtor’s current 
net worth, which by definition does not include contingent assets or liabilities.  See TEX. R. APP. 
P. 24.2(a)(1)(A).  As this Court has previously stated, ‘the plain language of the statute [TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE § 52.006] does not include a contingent money judgment in calculating net worth.’” 
(quoting Anderton v. Cawley, 326 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.))); see also 
O.C.T.G., L.L.P. v. Laguna Tubular Prods. Corp., 525 S.W.3d 822, 830–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (refusing to deem judgment liability as contingent and 
therefore reducing net worth); Business Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot Oil Serv., 392 S.W.3d 183, 187–
88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (per curiam) (“The trial court properly 
determined that because the judgment is a contingent liability it would not be included in the net worth 
calculation.”); Montelongo v. Exit Stage Left, Inc., 293 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, 
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The trial court determined that because the judgment is a contingent 
liability and because the homestead is exempt from execution they would not be included in the net 
worth calculation.  We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion . . . .”). 
94. As shown infra Part III.A.2, GAAP frequently includes on the balance sheet “contingent” 
liabilities.  Deeming a judgment liability to be “contingent” does not necessarily justify its exclusion 
from the balance sheet. 
95. Cf. O.C.T.G., L.L.P., 525 S.W.3d at 831 (“[Judgment debtor] fails to cite any authority 
supporting its contention that the judgment must be included in the net-worth calculation; indeed, it 
conceded at the hearing that it is unaware of any such authority.  Both parties offered testimony during 
the hearing as to whether the judgment should be included.  As the fact finder, the trial court is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.  In light of the 
evidence before the trial court and absent any authority to the contrary, we cannot say the trial abused 
its discretion in excluding the judgment.” (citations omitted)). 
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trial court to keep the judgment liability off of the balance sheet—because 
the judgment is allegedly “contingent.” 
Texas supersedeas law on judgment liabilities is a work in situational 
irony—a fire station burning to the ground.  The trial court, which has 
effectuated the liability (by rendering judgment following trial, summary 
judgment, or default judgment), has the power to deem the liability 
“contingent”—thereby characterizing it as less inevitable and ascertainable 
than other liabilities facing the judgment debtor.  As a legally contingent 
liability, the judgment liability does not lessen net worth; it is not a recognized 
liability under Texas law.96  Yet, the judgment debt’s exclusion from 
liabilities effectively prevents the judgment debtor from superseding the 
judgment pending appeal.  Having kept the judgment liability off the balance 
sheet, the same trial court becomes the very instrument for removing the 
contingent nature of the so-called contingent judgment: the trial court can 
allow the judgment to destroy the debtor’s overall net worth by making the 
judgment liability as real, impactful, and deleterious as any liability could 
possibly be.  The trial court can issue process to liquidate the judgment 
debtor’s inventories, bank accounts, and other personalty within a few weeks 
of the liability’s creation.97  Indeed, the trial court has power to “order the 
judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property that is in the debtor’s 
possession or is subject to the debtor’s control, together with all documents 
or records related to the property, to a designated sheriff or constable for 
execution” and to “appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession 
of the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the judgment 
creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judgment.”98  At the same time, 
the court can oversee judgment liens to cloud title on the debtor’s realty, so 
that the debtor cannot use such realty to conduct routine business or 
extraordinary business—like superseding a civil money judgment via a real-
estate sale to raise a cash deposit, or via real estate-backed financing for a 
cash deposit or bond.  The court can even force levy sales of the debtor’s 
land, buildings, oil and gas interests, and personal property by a sheriff or 
constable.99  The judgment liability affects the judgment debtor’s assets 
 
96. E.g., Business Staffing, 392 S.W.3d at 188. 
97. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a). 
98. Id. § 31.002(b)(1)–(b)(2). 
99. A trial court’s ability to oversee levy sales and general execution on a judgment debtor’s 
property arises from long-standing, diverse, and powerful procedural rules.  See, e.g., Gordon v. West 
Houston Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“A judgment-
holder can foreclose on a judgment lien either through an independent suit or through an execution sale.  
31
Holmes: Superseding Money Judgments in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019
  
100 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:69 
much more quickly and directly than would an unsecured accounts payable 
(a well-recognized balance-sheet liability100), which requires a trade creditor 
over many months or years to conduct litigation and reduce the debt to an 
enforceable judgment.  In sum, the very trial court that has deemed a 
judgment liability as not certain enough to lessen a judgment debtor’s net 
worth simultaneously can wreck all of the debtor’s net worth by overseeing 
the same liability’s strict and prompt enforcement. 
Under GAAP standards as promulgated and adopted by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the balance sheet would recognize 
and include a judgment liability as an accounting liability, like notes payable, 
accounts payable, or other debt.101  Accordingly, the judgment liability 
would lessen net worth under the formula of assets equaling both liabilities 
and equity.  The FASB in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 
6 Elements of Financial Statements102 defines a “liability” as follows: 
A liability has three essential characteristics: (a) it embodies a present duty or 
responsibility to one or more other entities that entails settlement by probable 
 
Execution is a method of enforcing a judgment by which a judgment creditor obtains from a court a 
writ of execution that meets certain requirements and delivers it to a sheriff or constable.”).  See TEX. R. 
CIV. P. 621, 622 & 629.  If the officer follows all appropriate procedures, the property may be sold to 
satisfy the judgment.  See TEX. R. CIV. P. 646a-650.” (citations omitted)); see also id. R. 637 (“When an 
execution is delivered to an officer he shall proceed without delay to levy the same upon the property of 
the defendant found within his county not exempt from execution, unless otherwise directed by the 
plaintiff, his agent or attorney. . . .”). 
100. E.g., O.C.T.G., L.L.P., 525 S.W.3d at 830 (recognizing a judgment debtor’s “payables to 
affiliates” as a balance-sheet liability under GAAP). 
101. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING CONCEPT NO. 6, ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS at CON6-1 (2008). 
102. Id.  Although it has not yet done so, the FASB has considered updating the definition of 
“liability” in the Conceptual Framework-Elements and Recognition.  As of March 15, 2010, the FASB had 
tentatively adopted the following working definition, subject to final approval of subsequent Exposure 
Draft Document and Final Standard: 
A liability of an entity is a present economic obligation for which the entity is the obligor.  Present 
means that on the date of the financial statements both the economic obligation exists and the 
entity is the obligor.  An economic obligation is an unconditional promise or other requirement 
to provide or forgo economic resources, including through risk protection.  An entity is the 
obligor if the entity is required to bear the economic obligation and its requirement to bear the 
economic obligation is enforceable by legal or equivalent means. 
Meeting Minutes from Financial Accounting Standards Board Project Team to Board Members, 
Conceptual Framework (Phase B) Board Meeting 2–3 (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.fasb.org/ 
board_meeting_minutes/10-20-08_cf.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SN8-KKN9].  For the time being, 
however, the definition of “liability” appearing in note 103 infra and accompanying text remains the 
operative GAAP definition. 
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future transfer or use of assets at a specified or determinable date, on 
occurrence of a specified event, or on demand, (b) the duty or responsibility 
obligates a particular entity, leaving it little or no discretion to avoid the future 
sacrifice, and (c) the transaction or other event obligating the entity has already 
happened.103   
Applying the foregoing FASB standard, per (a), a final civil judgment 
creates a present duty and responsibility upon a litigation defendant to 
transfer assets, as effectively as any liability could do so.  Further, per (b), it 
leaves little or no discretion for a defendant to avoid the future sacrifice of 
paying or otherwise satisfying the judgment.  Finally, per (c), the judgment 
results from an event that has already happened—namely, the litigation 
process that has determined a defendant’s liability for past occurrences.  
Under GAAP accounting, a judgment liability is as inevitable and 
ascertainable as a liability can be.104  Through the operation of the common 
law or (as this paper urges) by legislative action, Texas law should adopt the 
GAAP accounting viewpoint on judgment liability.105 
A civil judgment is “contingent” because an appeal may reverse it in 
whole or in part, thereby eliminating or changing the amount of debt for the 
judgment debtor to pay.  However, an appeal’s potential effects on a 
judgment do not transform it into a contingent liability any more so than 
business developments transform other liabilities into contingent liabilities.  
GAAP accounting frequently recognizes liabilities with uncertain collection 
 
103. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, para. 36 at CON6-13 
(emphasis added). 
104. See generally id. para. 39 at CON6-14 (“Although most liabilities result from agreements 
between entities, some obligations are imposed on entities by government or courts or are accepted to 
avoid imposition by government or courts (or costly efforts related thereto), and some relate to other 
nonreciprocal transfers from an entity to one or more other entities.”); id. para. 85 at CON6-24 (“Other 
gains or losses result from nonreciprocal transfers between an entity and other entities that are not its 
owners—for example, from gifts or donations, from winning a lawsuit, from thefts, and from 
assessments of fines or damages by courts.”). 
105. Texas law, elsewhere, recognizes the finality and certainty of civil judgments.  Scurlock Oil 
Co. v. Smithwick provides that a judgment is final for issue and claim preclusion purposes even though 
an appeal may be pending.  Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986).  Many Texas 
cases hold that “even though an appeal may be pending, a judgment is final in the sense that execution 
will issue in the absence of a supersedeas bond.”  Smith v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 82 S.W.3d 580, 585 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (citing Graham v. Thomas D. Murphy Co., 497 S.W.2d 
639, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).  See also Ziemian v. TX Arlington Oaks 
Apartments, Ltd., 233 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. struck) (“[E]ven though an 
appeal may be pending, a judgment may be final for certain purposes.  For example, a judgment can 
be final in the sense that execution will issue in the absence of a supersedeas bond.” (citation omitted)). 
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possibilities as actual liabilities that lessen net worth.  For instance, a bank 
might forego collection activity, such as litigation or selling off secured 
assets, on a debtor business’s notes payable.  A trade creditor might write 
off a debtor business’s accounts payable, particularly if collection efforts 
would be costly and time-consuming.  A federal, state, or local taxing 
authority might provide an accommodation or forgiveness to the taxes that 
a debtor business owes.  Nonetheless, as long as the liability—the notes 
payable, accounts payable, or taxes payable in these examples—remains a 
liability on a balance sheet and (potentially) a charge against income,106 it 
lessens overall net worth.  Until the bank, trade creditor, or taxing authority 
releases the debt owed, or until the time for payment becomes so attenuated, 
the liability remains on the balance sheet.  GAAP will recognize the 
liability—despite its contingent nature—because it has the hallmarks of an 
accounting “liability”: “a present duty or responsibility,” leaving “little to no 
discretion” to avoid payment or other satisfaction, on transactions that have 
“already happened.”107 
2. Even If Deemed a “Contingent” Liability, a Judgment Liability 
Should Lessen Net Income and, Thus, Net Worth 
GAAP regularly deems so-called “contingent” liabilities as worthy of 
impacting net worth.  GAAP lessens net worth via charging contingent 
liabilities against income.108  The FASB’s Accounting Standard 
Codification (“ASC”) 450 promulgates the accounting standard for 
 
106. A charge against income on an income statement will lessen overall net worth, just as the 
inclusion of liability does.  See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, 
at CON6-2 (“Losses are decreases in equity (net assets) from peripheral or incidental transactions of 
an entity and from all other transactions and other events and circumstances affecting the entity except 
those that result from expenses or distributions to owner.”).  Indeed, the two accounting entries are 
flip sides of the same coin; a credit increases a liability account (such as accounts payable), while a debit 
increases an expense (such as overhead expenses).  KIESO ET AL., supra note 84, at 64.  At 
reconciliation, when credit and debit entries are closed out for a certain time period, the charges against 
income (specifically, the expense-related debits) lessen income.  Id. at 67–68, 85.  The positive effects 
of income (or the negative effects of losses) impact equity on the balance sheet’s right side; income, as 
a type of credit, increases equity – whereas losses, as a type of debit, lessen it.  See  id. at 65, 85; see also 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, at CON6-2 & para. 231 at CON6-50 
(explaining transactions resulting in a decrease in equity are losses).  Thus, by lessening equity directly, 
charges against income lessen overall net worth. 
107. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, para. 36 at CON6-13. 
108. Because charges against income and inclusions of liabilities are flip sides of the same coin, 
a credit entry to increase a liability account would be necessary as well.  KIESO ET AL., supra note 84, at 
64–65; FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, para. 231 at CON6-50. 
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recognizing a contingent liability’s effect on net worth.  ASC 450 states in 
relevant part that “an estimated loss from a loss contingency shall be accrued 
by a charge to income if both of the following conditions are met”: 
a. Information available before the financial statements are issued or are 
available to be issued indicates that it is probable that an asset had been impaired 
or a liability had been incurred at the date of the financial statements.  Date of 
the financial statements means the end of the most recent accounting 
period for which financial statements are being presented.  It is implicit in 
this condition that it must be probable that one or more future events will 
occur confirming the fact of the loss. 
b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.109  
Despite its contingent nature—which arises from the possibility of 
appellate reversal, or some other litigation development—a judgment 
liability subject to an appeal is clearly incurred by the business or 
businessperson bearing the liability, thus satisfying subsection (a).  Further, 
the judgment’s financial impact—the potential loss—is reasonably 
estimable, thus satisfying subsection (b).  Under GAAP accounting, a 
judgment liability would lessen net worth even when litigation parties or 
courts deem the liability as contingent because of an appeal.  Through 
common law or by legislative action, Texas law should adopt the same 
GAAP accounting viewpoint. 
  
 
109. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES 
EXPOSURE DRAFT, CONTINGENCIES (TOPIC 450) 8 (2010) (emphasis added).  This “ASC 450” as it 
is called constitutes the basis for Johnson & Johnson’s and Exxon Mobil’s accruals of potential—that 
is, “contingent”—losses from lawsuits and civil judgments, discussed in note 87 supra.  Frequently, 
large publicly traded companies do not enter single line-items on their balance sheets to reflect 
individual judgments, instead grouping them into larger line-items like “Accrued Liabilities” or “Other 
Liabilities,” e.g., 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) for Johnson & Johnson (Feb. 20, 2019), at 34—
because a reporting regulation allows them to group together, and not report individually, any liability 
that is five percent or less than total liabilities.  17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02(24).  For companies the size of 
Johnson & Johnson, even multi-billion-dollar judgment liabilities rarely equal or exceed five percent of 
total liabilities. 
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3. Relying on the Statute’s Failure to Mention “Contingent Money 
Judgments” Merely Circumvents Meaningful Analysis of a Judgment’s 
Impact on Net Worth and, Moreover, Constitutes Poor Statutory 
Construction 
The intermediate courts addressing a judgment debt’s effect on net worth 
have avoided thinking through the difficult issues; instead, they have 
concluded that because the statute does not expressly mention judgment 
liabilities or state that such liabilities affect net worth, those sorts of liabilities 
must play no role in determining net worth.  Specifically, these courts have 
observed, “[t]he plain language of the statute does not include a contingent 
money judgment in calculating net worth,” and then have excluded 
summarily the judgment as a balance-sheet debt.110 
The lack of statutory language on exactly which debts affect net worth 
should not exclude judgment debts automatically from a net worth 
determination.  The statute does not mention accounts payable or bank 
debt, yet no published decision has excluded those established GAAP debts 
from the net worth determination; clearly, under GAAP and under Texas 
case law, they constitute balance-sheet liabilities that lessen net worth.111  
Accounts payables and bank debt have the indicia of an accounting 
“liability”; they embody “a present duty or responsibility,” leave “little to no 
discretion” to avoid payment or other satisfaction, and represent 
transactions that have “already happened.”112 
Concluding that judgment debts could lessen net worth under the statute 
would constitute a proper, defensible interpretation of the statute’s 
language: “net worth.”  Indeed, statutes often require court interpretation in 
order to enhance and flesh out the statutory meaning.  This process results 
in quality statutory construction.  When engaging in statutory construction, 
Texas courts embrace the ultimate purpose of understanding legislative 
 
110. O.C.T.G., L.L.P. v. Laguna Tubular Prods. Corp., 525 S.W.3d 822, 831 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); Business Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot 
Oil Service, 392 S.W.3d 183, 187–88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); 
McCullough v. Scarbrough, Medlin & Assocs., 362 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); 
Anderton v. Cawley, 326 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, [mand. denied]). 
111. See O.C.T.G. L.L.P., 525 S.W.3d at 830 (“We conclude it was error for the trial court to 
eliminate [judgment debtor’s] payables to affiliates from its net-worth calculation based on the GAAP 
consolidation rule.”); Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905, 920 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (acknowledging in the context of GAAP debts: 
“outstanding debt of approximately 75 million pounds to the Bank of Scotland relating to the Seven 
Heads gas field”). 
112. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, para. 36 at CON6-13. 
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intent,113 with such understanding arising primarily from the written 
statutory language.114  Perhaps the most succinct and oft-quoted summary 
of the principles underlying Texas statutory construction comes from a 
landmark 1920 Texas Supreme Court case, as follows: 
Courts must take statutes as they find them. More than that, they should 
be willing to take them as they find them.  They should search out carefully 
the intendment of a statute, giving full effect to all of its terms.  But they must 
find its intent in its language, and not elsewhere.  They are not the law-making body.  
They are not responsible for omissions in legislation.  They are responsible 
for a true and fair interpretation of the written law.  It must be an 
interpretation which expresses only the will of the makers of the law, not 
forced nor strained, but simply such as the words of the law in their plain sense fairly 
sanction and will clearly sustain.115 
With adherence to ascertaining legislative intent from written statutory 
language, Texas courts often amplify or restrict the meaning of specific 
statutory language, with or without citations to legislative deliberations 
specifically addressing such language.  Statutory language can require court 
interpretation and construction via case law analysis—and that analysis 
often moves a thinking court far away from the actual, written statutory 
language at hand.  Consider the statute’s phrase “the amount of 
compensatory damages awarded in the judgment”116; the Texas Supreme 
Court has settled a division in the intermediate courts over whether 
attorney’s fees awards constitute such “compensatory damages”—
concluding that typically they do not and, thus, do not require 
supersedeas.117  Most of the court’s analysis in the opinion focused on the 
 
113. See Rocor Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. 2002) (“When 
construing statutes, our ultimate purpose is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.  In determining that 
intent, we may look to the statute’s underlying purpose.” (citing Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation 
Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999))). 
114. See, e.g., Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex. 2001) (“We must 
construe statutes as written and, if possible, ascertain legislative intent from the statute’s language.” 
(citing Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. 1985))). 
115. Simmons v. Arnim, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (Tex. 1920) (emphasis added). 
116. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(a)(1). 
117. In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 174, 174–75 (Tex. 2013) (orig. 
proceeding) (holding that awards of “attorney’s fees incurred in the prosecution or defense of a claim 
are not compensatory damages” under the statute, even though such awards are compensatory damages 
in certain contexts). 
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meaning of “attorney’s fees” and “compensatory damages” in case law and 
in statutes other than the statute the court was directly construing.118 
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has addressed disgorgement style 
remedies, concluding that disgorgement awards are not “compensatory 
damages” under the statute and, thus, do not require supersedeas.119  And, 
the phrase “the judgment debtor’s net worth”120 itself required an appellate 
decision that the Texas Legislature must have meant “the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities determined in accordance with 
GAAP,”121 rather than some alternate financial measure of a business (or 
business person) as a going concern.122  Both of these statutory 
construction opinions included lengthy and well-reasoned analyses of case 
law and broad legal principles.  To that end, each opinion moved far away 
from the actual, written statutory language at hand. 
In the foregoing examples, the reviewing courts engaged in statutory 
construction of terms of art or of language having a specialized meaning—
namely, “the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the 
judgment”123 and “the judgment debtor’s net worth”124 in the statute.  The 
courts did not look to—and should not have looked to—common usage 
and parlance in order to construe these unique phrases.125  Rather, the 
courts had to move away from the actual statutory language at hand and had 
 
118. See generally id. at 172–75 (explaining the legislature has never defined attorney’s fees as 
constituting damages, despite the substantial component of a civil judgment that attorney’s fees 
comprise). 
119. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 361 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (holding 
disgorgement damages are not under the statute “compensatory damages” requiring supersedeas  
because “equitable forfeiture ‘is not mainly compensatory . . . nor is it mainly punitive’ and ‘cannot . . . 
be measured by . . . actual damages’” and “[d]isgorgement is compensatory in the same sense attorney 
fees, interest, and costs are, but it is not damages” (citing Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 240 (Tex. 
1999))). 
120. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(1). 
121. Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). 
122. See generally Letter from Warren E. Buffett to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
(Feb. 23, 2019), at 3; Letter from Warren E. Buffett to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
(Feb. 26, 2011), at 4, 7 & 8–10 (both distinguishing “book value” valuation metrics, which are 
functionally equivalent to GAAP “net worth,” from superior valuation metrics that assess “intrinsic 
value”—specifically, metrics that value businesses in light of their future expected earnings, discounted 
to present value). 
123. In re Nalle, 406 S.W.3d at 170, 173–74; In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d at 361. 
124. Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd., 171 S.W.3d at 915. 
125. Cf. Baggett v. State, 367 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d) (noting 
when a statutory term “has not acquired a technical meaning and may be interpreted according to its 
common usage” (quoting Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012))). 
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to discuss disparate case law, other statutes, and other legal principles.  In 
effect, the courts were seeking the meaning of these “technical” or 
“particular” statutory phrases by way of surveying and discussing a broad 
variety of sources.126 
A lack of statutory language about judgment debts, therefore, does not 
constitute a bar to including such debts as balance-sheet debts or as charges 
against income, either of which would lessen overall net worth.  The same 
lack of statutory language has not acted as a bar to including accounts 
payable as a balance-sheet liability that lessens net worth.  The same lack of 
statutory language has not kept Texas courts from adopting the GAAP 
definition of “net worth” in lieu of some other definition. 
4. A Judgment Liability May Result in “Negative Net Worth”— 
a Good Means for Adherence to GAAP and for Promoting Litigation 
Efficiencies 
Negative net worth occurs whenever a debtor’s total liabilities exceed its 
total assets.127  Negative net worth can occur in connection with a balance 
sheet judgment debt: for instance, if a judgment debtor had a pre-judgment 
net worth of $500,000—that is, its total assets exceeded its total liabilities by 
$500,000—and the debtor was facing a $30 million judgment, then GAAP 
would deem the debtor’s post-judgment net worth as negative $29,500,000, 
which is $500,000 minus $30 million. 
Several of the intermediate appellate courts addressing a judgment debt’s 
effect on net worth have grappled with a negative net worth scenario.128  
One of these courts stated the judgment creditor’s position that using 
judgment liability to derive negative net worth can result in absurdity:  
“[Judgment creditor] argues that taking the judgment into account would 
produce absurd results because in some cases the judgment would lead to a 
negative net worth, thereby relieving the judgment debtor of having to 
deposit any money to suspend enforcement of the judgment.”129 
 
126. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(b) (“Words and phrases that have acquired a 
technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed 
accordingly.”). 
127. AICPA, FORENSIC AND VALUATION SERVICES PRACTICE AID: PROVIDING 
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION SERVICES 32 (2d ed. 2016) (acknowledging distressed 
companies may have “[l]ow or negative levels of equity”). 
128. See supra note 93. 
129. Montelongo v. Exit Stage Left, Inc., 293 S.W.3d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, orig. 
proceeding [mand. denied]). 
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Without question, courts engaging in statutory construction must eschew 
any construction that leads to an absurd result.130  However, construing the 
existing statute so as to allow judgment liabilities to lessen judgment debtors’ 
net worths—even to result in negative net worths—would not produce an 
absurdity.  Likewise, amending the statute to make it express and clear that 
judgment liabilities can lessen net worths—even to the extent of negative 
net worths—would not result in absurdity.  Since at least 2005, just two years 
after the existing statute’s promulgation, Texas courts have embraced the 
GAAP measure of “net worth,” namely, the difference between total assets 
and total liabilities determined in accordance with GAAP.131  The simple 
math behind this net worth measure lends itself to the possibility of a 
negative: if the assets are less than the liabilities, the resulting equity amount 
(i.e., the net worth) necessarily becomes a negative number, meaning the 
business owner or businessperson owes more in liabilities than he has in the 
way of assets.   
If, for instance, a business owns $100,000 in land, $50,000 in equities and 
money-market funds, and another $50,000 in inventories, its assets would 
total $200,000.  Entirely within the contemplation of GAAP, the same 
business may have cumulative liabilities of $300,000 by way of accounts 
payable, notes payable, long-term debt, and charges against income.  Thus, 
the business would have a negative net worth of $100,000—more 
specifically, the business would owe another $100,000 to creditors even if it 
sold its assets at book value, thereby realizing $200,000 in sales proceeds, 
 
130. E.g., City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008) (“[W]e construe the 
statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning . . . unless such a construction leads to 
absurd results.” (citations omitted)). 
131. The first published opinion in which a Texas appellate court adopted the GAAP measure 
of “net worth” appears to be the Fourteenth District’s 2005 opinion in Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo 
Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C..  Ramco Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Anglo Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 171 S.W.3d 905, 914–15 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).  The court concluded after looking to federal case 
law for an understanding of “net worth,” that: 
[t]he [l]egislature could have required the trial court to determine the Security Amount based on 
50 percent of a judgment debtor’s value, using whatever measure of value the trial court found to 
be most appropriate.  However, the Legislature did not do so; instead, it required that the trial 
court base this determination on the judgment debtor’s “net worth.”  While determining “net 
worth” under GAAP may be quite complicated and may involve different considerations based 
on the circumstances of the judgment debtor and based on GAAP, the unambiguous meaning of 
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and gave such proceeds to its creditors.  This scenario’s negative net worth 
is not an absurd132 result or an absurd situation.  The scenario reflects the 
actual state of affairs for this particular business in the business world—it 
simply owes $100,000 more than its existing assets will cover.  Indeed, a 
business’s becoming overly indebted and achieving negative net worth are 
entirely possible in an American marketplace with plentiful bank financing, 
eager private-equity financing, and liberal trade credit.   
Likewise, a situation where a debtor under judgment liability may have a 
negative net worth is not an absurd result.  The result and the situation, 
rather, reflect the actual state of affairs for the judgment debtor in the legal 
system and in the business world—the debtor owes more in the way of 
judgment debt and business debt than its existing assets will cover.  As 
mentioned earlier, the judgment debtor would potentially commit fraud and 
securities law violations in the business world if it failed to disclose to 
creditors, banks, auditors, shareholders, or business partners that a 
judgment liability had pushed the debtor into negative net worth.133 
As long as Texas embraces the GAAP measure of net worth, Texas 
litigants should expect that judgment debtors could have negative net 
worths, particularly when their business and judgment debts exceed their 
existing assets.  If Texas litigants do not wish for judgment debtors to have 
negative net worths as a result of their business and judgment debts, then 
they must urge either the Texas Legislature by statute or the Texas Supreme 
Court by case law to alter existing Texas law so that the law does not utilize 
a GAAP measure of net worth or so that it utilizes some modified version 
of that measure.  The current compromise—resulting from those 
intermediate appellate court opinions that exclude judgments from balance-
sheet liabilities134—is an untenable one.  The compromise does not abide 
by and, in fact, conflicts with GAAP. 
Going beyond the foregoing conclusion—that Texas case law has made 
its GAAP bed and so must lie in it—good policy flows from the possibility 
that judgment debtors could have negative net worth as a result of their 
business and judgment debts.  Efficiencies may follow for the litigants, trial 
courts, and appellate courts.  A plaintiff with the possibility of becoming a 
 
132. See generally Absurdity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “absurdity” to 
mean “[t]he state or quality of being grossly unreasonable; esp., an interpretation that would lead to an 
unconscionable result, esp. one that the parties or (esp. for a statute) the drafters could not have 
intended and probably never considered.”). 
133. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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judgment creditor will have to consider the scenarios that could result from 
its litigation efforts: a judgment liability on the defendant that preserves 
some net worth, thereby obligating the defendant to provide some judgment 
security, versus a judgment liability on the defendant that wipes out its net 
worth, thereby relieving the defendant of any supersedeas obligation.135  
The decision before the plaintiff could create disincentives towards 
overloading the litigation process—and particularly the jury charge136—
with excessive damages theories and claims for recovery, such as ambitious, 
creative, and speculative compensatory damages.137  Such a plaintiff would 
do better to narrow down its litigation efforts to fewer, higher-quality claims, 
which a Texas appellate court might actually uphold.  Moreover, by 
narrowing down efforts to fewer claims, such a plaintiff would enhance its 
ability to obtain judgment security (by way of cash deposits, supersedeas 
bonds, or other means explored in this paper) because it would not have 
wiped out the judgment debtor’s net worth with an inflated, unsustainable 
judgment.138  The policy benefits for the defendant are obvious: the 
plaintiff may pursue fewer and lower-dollar claims, resulting in less defense 
costs and less litigation uncertainty and stress.  Further, the defendant can 
more readily supersede a judgment and pursue an appeal. 
  
 
135. Plaintiffs frequently know or can closely approximate a defendant’s net worth, even before 
post-judgment discovery.  Pre-trial discovery, the plaintiff’s pre-suit dealings with the defendant, as 
well as publicly available information can reveal most of the defendant’s assets and can provide 
substantial insights into the defendant’s debts. 
136. See, e.g., Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, 580 S.W.3d 687, 702 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2019, no pet.) (reviewing a “three-week trial, [after which] the trial court gave the jury a 69-page 
jury charge that contained 54 questions, many of which contained multiple parts” and reversing the great majority 
of damages claims against the defendants) (emphasis added). 
137. Certainly, some cases call for broad-ranging damages theories and claims so that a plaintiff 
has no choice other than to plead and prove as many means for obtaining damages as are possible.  
But this is the extreme case, involving truly egregious conduct by a defendant or involving substantial 
legal or factual complexity.  More often, a plaintiff is making a conscious effort to increase damages—
for instance, by pleading tort claims into contract cases, or by seeking individual liability on business 
owners instead of solely entity liability. 
138. The salutary effects discussed in this paragraph apply primarily to cases involving the small- 
to medium-sized business or businessperson.  That is, discouraging the pursuit of inflated 
compensatory damages against large businesses, such as publicly traded corporations and partnerships, 
makes less policy sense because in 2003 the legislature capped such businesses’ supersedeas obligations 
at $25 million.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(2).  Accordingly, a large business will 
more likely find aid by way of the $25 million supersedeas cap than by way of this paper’s proposal to 
include a judgment liability on the balance sheet when determining net worth. 
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B. Proposed Reform No. 2: An Absolute Right to “Alternate Security,” 
Which Usually Provides the Best Supersedeas Security for the Parties 
The smaller business defendant in Texas is likely to have substantial real 
estate holdings and/or personal property with which it can supersede a 
judgment by means of security interests in real property, such as would arise 
under deeds of trust or other liens on realty, and by means of U.C.C. security 
interests on personalty.  These sorts of security interests would be in the 
judgment creditor’s favor, with prescriptions on when the creditor could 
foreclose and sell the assets.139   
Such “alternate security” is preferable to either a bond or cash deposit; 
alternate security avoids the transactional costs of financing a bond or selling 
real estate to raise a cash deposit.  Avoiding these transactional costs benefits 
the judgment debtor by preserving its resources for the appeal and for 
regular business; it also benefits the judgment creditor by preserving assets 
against which the creditor can collect following the appeal’s conclusion.  For 
instance, a judgment creditor with a deed of trust to an unencumbered 
$5 million in real estate of the judgment debtor—when the debtor has not 
expended cash on a bond and has not expended resources in supersedeas-
related litigation—holds far better judgment security than the judgment 
creditor that has forced the debtor to hastily sell assets in order to raise a 
cash deposit.140  The same judgment creditor is better off than one that has 
 
139. Deeds of trust, for instance, contain terms under which a creditor (usually a bank) can 
foreclose on realty and sell the same for cash proceeds (usually upon the debtor’s failure to pay a debt).  
See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (prescribing procedures for “a sale of real property under a 
power of sale conferred by a deed of trust or other contract lien”).  Security agreements accompanying 
U.C.C. financing statements contain terms under which a secured party can sell a debtor’s personalty 
for cash proceeds.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(39) (defining a financing statement 
as “a record or records composed of an initial financial statement and any filed record relating to the 
initial financing statement.”).  When used as alternate security, the terms of the deed of trust or security 
agreement would specify that the judgment creditor could sell property only upon conclusion of the 
appellate process, only if and when a final judgment continues to make a defendant (a judgment debtor) 
liable to a plaintiff (a judgment creditor), and only if and when a defendant does not satisfy the 
judgment with other means. 
140. If the creditor has forced the asset sale via writs of execution or other collections process, 
the creditor not only has depleted or wasted assets for eventual collection purposes, but also has run 
the risk of becoming a defendant in satellite litigation over the wrongful selling of the assets.  See TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 34.022(a)–(b) (“A person is entitled to recover from the judgment 
creditor the market value of the person’s property that has been seized through execution of a writ 
issued by a court if the judgment on which execution is issued is reversed or set aside but the property 
has been sold at execution.  The amount of recovery is determined by the market value at the time of 
sale of the property sold.”); Ziemian v. TX Arlington Oaks Apts., Ltd., 233 S.W.3d 548, 557 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d) (“[Section 34.022 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code] appears 
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forced the judgment debtor to spend hundreds of thousands annually to 
maintain a supersedeas bond. 
Presently, the judgment debtor (the defendant) would have to seek the 
trial court’s permission to use alternate security instead of the more 
traditional bond or cash deposit.  The trial court has discretion entirely to 
disallow alternate security, and challenging the trial court’s use of discretion 
in the appellate courts is unlikely to lead to success for the aggrieved 
defendant. 
Addressing alternate security, the leading commentator on the statute and 
the procedural rule posits as follows: 
[A] debtor who lacks the liquidity to post bond but who could pledge 
sufficient unencumbered assets should establish that value and argue the 
sufficiency of that protection. . . . 
[A] judgment creditor who files its judgment with the clerk in the county 
where the judgment debtor possesses real property, absent supersedeas, 
creates a lien on the property.  The value of this lien may be sufficient 
protection so that an additional supersedeas requirement may be excused.[141] 
Working from the foregoing framework, amendments to the statute 
should allow a judgment debtor to provide a security interest (such as one 
arising from a deed of trust) in the creditor’s favor on real estate holdings, 
which may include oil and gas interests, land, commercial or residential 
buildings, and similar real estate assets to the extent they are not 
encumbered.  The same amendments should allow a judgment debtor to 
provide a U.C.C. security interest in the creditor’s favor on personal 
property, which may include livestock, crops, inventories, equipment, oil 
and gas production held in storage or in transit,142 and registered or 
 
to presume an execution that was valid at the time it was made, followed by a change in circumstances 
that would make it unjust for the executing party to retain the value of the property seized.”); Cruz v. 
Ghani, No. 05-17-00566-CV, 2018 WL 6566642, at *23 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2018, pet. denied) 
(mem. op.) (evaluating a judgment creditor’s liability for the forced sale of the debtor’s condominium 
for a mere $25,000 when it had a market value of $217,500). 
141. Carlson, supra note 8, at 1094 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.001).  An elaboration 
from Professor Carlson’s idea, and from this paper’s many security-interest observations and analyses, 
appears in Part VI infra in connection with a new Section 52.006(b)(2)(a)-(d) for the Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code. 
142. In the author’s direct experience, secured parties can and do obtain U.C.C. security 
interests in oil and gas production that is stored in specific locations, such as crude oil in tankage at 
Midland, Texas, or that is being “shipped” (i.e., transported continuously via pipeline) to a certain 
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unregistered securities.  Qualified appraisal professionals, such as a 
petroleum engineer for oil and gas interests, an oil and gas marketing 
consultant for severed production, a real estate appraiser for land, and a 
livestock appraiser for cattle, should establish the value of the property to 
be used as alternate security. 
As with interest earned on a cash deposit, any earnings to the alternate-
security property pending the appeal would accrue to the judgment debtor.  
Also, the judgment debtor would have the right to continue using the 
property in the course of its regular business.143 
C. Proposed Reform No. 3: Redetermining Judgment Security During the Appeal 
to Avoid Superseding an Ersatz Judgment 
During the months or years-long journey to the Texas Supreme Court or 
United States Supreme Court following an appellate victory that has reduced 
the judgment liability, the judgment debtor must continue to supersede the 
security amount demanded by the original judgment144—despite the 
judgment’s suspect nature.  In order to lessen or avoid the costs of 
maintaining a supersedeas bond, or other supersedeas-related transactional 
costs, stemming from the original judgment, Texas law should enable 
judgment debtors to lower their supersedeas burdens during the appeal to 
the Texas or federal high courts when a decision by an intermediate 
appellate court has reduced the judgment liability. 
Amendments to the statute and procedural rule to allow for such 
reduction may allow (or may forbid) the converse: the increasing of the 
security amount during an appeal and before its conclusion in light of an 
appellate decision that increases a defendant’s monetary liability.  However, 
even if the amendments provide for a “two-way street,” on balance they will 
favor judgment debtors more than creditors.  Most commonly, Texas 
appellate courts reduce monetary liability for defendants; seldom do they 
 
location, such as the same oil traveling to Midland via the Permian Basin Gathering system operated 
by Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. 
143. Cf. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 52.006(e); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(d) (both providing that “the trial 
court may not make any order that interferes with the judgment debtor’s use, transfer, conveyance, or 
dissipation of assets in the normal course of business”). 
144. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 1105 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 24.1 and concluding: “there is no 
authority that empowers the trial court to order an increase or decrease in appellate security premised 
upon an appellate court judgment when that judgment is subject to further appellate review, and no 
mandate has issued”); see id. at 1106 (“[T]he trial court judgment should remain the operative judgment 
until the appellate process is complete and a judgment is entered by the appellate court and the appellate 
court issues its mandate requiring recognition and enforcement of its judgment.”). 
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increase such liability.145  Further, even when an appellate decision 
increases monetary liability on appeal, other supersedeas-related 
amendments proposed by this paper will protect judgment debtors that 
must provide more judgment security—especially the amendment to allow 
a judgment liability (including a re-determined liability under a continuing 
appeal) to lessen a judgment debtor’s overall net worth. 
D. Proposed Reform No. 4: The Subordination or Removal of Judgment-Related 
Liens and Freeing Up Assets Necessary for Supersedeas 
Seemingly Texas law would allow a judgment debtor to subordinate or 
remove the judgment-related liens, as necessary, when it needed to use real 
estate for purposes of raising a cash deposit or obtaining a bond.  Many 
times following the 2003 supersedeas reforms, Texas courts have 
acknowledged the absolute nature of a judgment debtor’s right to supersede 
a judgment pending appeal.146  The Texas Supreme Court has observed 
several times that a judgment debtor’s right to supersede a judgment takes 
precedence over a judgment creditor’s right to collect on a judgment or to 
protect its security interests.147  Existing Texas case law and statutory law 
certainly empower a trial court to subordinate or remove judgment-related 
liens in a variety of contexts.148  Although one dated Texas case holds that 
judgment-collection efforts, when begun before supersedeas efforts, can 
 
145. See, e.g., Stephens v. Three Finger Black Shale P’ship, 580 S.W.3d 687, 697 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2018, no pet.) (reviewing a judgment well in excess of $50 million and reversing the great 
majority of damages claims against the defendants); Hardwick v. Smith Energy Co., 500 S.W.3d 474, 
479, 486–88 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (relieving a defendant 
from a judgment of over $8.5 million, reducing the judgment to $79,428). 
146. See, e.g., Miga v. Jensen, 299 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2009) (“A judgment debtor is entitled to 
supersede the judgment while pursuing an appeal . . . .”). 
147. See, e.g., In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 170 (Tex. 2013) (orig. 
proceeding) (“House Bill 4 ‘reflect[ed] a new balance between the judgment creditor’s right in the 
judgment and the dissipation of the judgment debtor’s assets during the appeal against the judgment 
debtor’s right to meaningful and easier access to appellate review.’”). 
148. See Alford v. Thornburg, 113 S.W.3d 575, 588 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (“We 
affirm the trial court’s order directing [Plaintiff] to release the abstract of judgment and the lis 
pendens.”); see also Daves v. Lawyers Sur. Corp., 459 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1970, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“[T]he district court . . . entered judgment removing the abstract of judgment as a 
cloud on [defendant’s] property.”); PROP. § 52.0011(a)(1)–(2) (prescribing two rules for when a 
judgment lien does not encumber real property).  Further, the Texas Property Code itself implicitly 
recognizes that “further action[s]” may be taken in any court with respect to an abstract of judgment 
or judgment lien.  Cf. PROP. § 52.042 (“[A]ny abstract of judgment or judgment lien is canceled and 
released without further action in any court and may not be enforced [under certain circumstances].” 
(emphasis added)). 
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preclude the debtor’s filing of a supersedeas bond, a prominent 
commentator on Texas law believes that case, from 1990, ceased being good 
law upon the 1997 reforms to supersedeas laws.149 
So, what prevents a judgment debtor’s use of its real estate holdings to 
supersede a judgment?  Despite Texas law’s tendency to favor such efforts, 
ultimately, a trial court—using its discretion—may disallow the debtor’s use 
of real estate holdings for supersedeas purposes.  Challenging a trial court’s 
discretion by way of appeal or mandamus proceeding is fraught with 
expense, difficulty, and uncertainty. 
For the sake of business litigants that must supersede a judgment by using 
real estate, Texas law should enable the litigants to subordinate or remove 
any and all judgment-related liens hindering the real estate’s use in a sale for 
cash or as collateral for a bond.  Judgment creditors receive adequate 
protection by way of a cash deposit or bond; indeed, the procedural rule 
expressly contemplates that a cash deposit or bond is sufficient protection 
for judgment creditors.150  The statute and the procedural rule presently do 
not entitle judgment creditors to any greater protection than a cash deposit 
or bond.  Judgment creditors, therefore, will suffer no diminution in rights 
if they can no longer use judgment-related liens to block judgment debtors’ 
efforts to obtain a cash deposit or a bond.  Only those litigants seeking an 
absurd result, or more likely seeking to apply on a defendant onerous 
pressure to settle a case, would oppose the subordination or removal of 
 
149. Noted commentator William Dorsaneo, who sits on the Texas Supreme Court’s Rules 
Advisory Committee and played a role in its drafting of the current Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, 
believes that Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Engelke, 790 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, 
orig. proceeding), is no longer good case law.  William Dorsaneo has written: 
Prior to the 1997 amendments, one court of appeals [in Engelke] reasoned that once levy 
occurred . . . a later filed supersedeas bond “did not, and could not, have vacated the fixed rights 
of the judgment creditor to the proceeds seized pursuant to the levy.”  The Engelke holding 
precedes the 1997 amendments to the Appellate Rules.  Before the amendments, Appellate Rule 
47(j) provided that a proper supersedeas bond was effective to suspend execution of the judgment 
“if execution has been issued” [see former TEX. R. APP. P. 47(j)] . . . .  After the 1997 
amendments, the Appellate Rules refer to the issuance of the writ of execution, but provide that 
“[e]nforcement begun before the judgment is superseded must cease when the judgment is 
superseded” [TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(f)].  Thus, this aspect of Engelke is probably not applicable after 
the 1997 amendments. 
10 William V. Dorsaneo III et al., TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 148.05[2] (2016). 
150. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(2)–(3) (stating the methods by which a judgment debtor may 
supersede the judgment against him). 
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judgment-related liens so as to hinder the real estate’s use in a sale for cash 
or as collateral for a bond. 
IV.    PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 52.006, 
WITH SUMMARY EXPLANATION 
With the foregoing reform arguments so presented, here in underlined 
bold are the proposed amendments to the statute.  (Working with the Rules 
Advisory Committee, the Texas Supreme Court would need to amend Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24 to ensure its consistency with the statute so 
amended.)  Explanations, when and as necessary, appear in italics with 
brackets. 
Sec. 52.006.  AMOUNT OF SECURITY FOR MONEY JUDGMENT.  
(a) Subject to subsection (c), when a judgment is for money, the amount of 
security must equal the sum of: 
(1) the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the judgment before 
the appeal or, pursuant to subsection (e)(2), as revised by appellate 
action before mandate; 
(2) interest for the estimated duration of the appeal;  and 
(3) costs awarded in the judgment before the appeal or, pursuant to 
subsection (e)(2), as revised by appellate action before mandate. 
[“Subjection (b)” has changed to “(c)” in light of the new subsection (b)(1)-(2) below.  
Also, the phrase “before the appeal or, pursuant to subsection (e)(2), as revised by 
appellate action before mandate” becomes necessary because subsection (e)(2) below 
provides the judgment debtor with an absolute right to security-amount redetermination 
during the appeal and before the appeal’s conclusion, which typically is occasioned by a 
mandate under Rule of Appellate Procedure 18.] 
(b)(1) The judgment debtor has a right to supersede a judgment by 
means of: 
(a) filing with the trial court clerk a written agreement with the 
judgment creditor for suspending enforcement of the judgment; 
(b) filing with the trial court clerk a good and sufficient bond; 
(c) making a deposit with the trial court clerk in lieu of a bond; or 
(d) providing alternate security in favor of the judgment creditor. 
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(b)(2)(a) Alternate security may consist of a mortgage, deed of trust, 
lien, or other instrument creating security interests in the judgment 
creditor’s favor under Chapters 51 or 64 of the Property Code, or under 
other applicable law, on the judgment debtor’s real estate holdings to 
the extent those assets are unencumbered, including land, 
commercial or residential buildings, rents from real property, oil and 
gas working interests, oil and gas royalty interests, mineral-ownership 
rights, and other real estate assets, following a valuation appraisal of 
the same by a qualified professional.   
 
(b)(2)(b) Alternate security may consist of a security interest in the 
judgment creditor’s favor under Chapters 1 or 9 of the Business and 
Commerce Code, or under other applicable law, on the judgment 
debtor’s personal property to the extent those assets are 
unencumbered, including livestock, crops, inventories, accounts, 
instruments, fixtures, equipment, oil and gas production held in 
storage or in transit, registered or unregistered securities, jewelry, and 
other personalty, following a valuation appraisal of the same by a 
qualified professional.   
 
(b)(2)(c) During the appeal, the judgment debtor will continue to 
manage and use the real estate holdings and personalty that is being 
used as alternate security.  The judgment debtor will receive any 
earnings from the real estate holdings and personalty that is being 
used as alternate security. 
 
(b)(2)(d) The judgment debtor has a right to elect to use as many or 
as few security interests as it chooses, in whichever form it chooses, 
in order to supersede a judgment by using alternate security. 
 
[Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1(a) contains the four means by which the judgment 
debtor can supersede a judgment: agreement, bond, cash deposit, and alternate security.  
This amendment lists the first three means verbatim from the procedural rule, but revises 
the listing of alternate security and defines it so as to provide the judgment debtor with an 
absolute right to alternate security – not dependent on a trial court’s discretion.  The 
smaller business defendant in Texas likely will have substantial real estate holdings or 
personal property with which it can supersede a judgment by means of a deed of trust, lien, 
or other security interest in the judgment creditor’s favor; and, such “alternate security” is 
often preferable to either a bond or cash deposit.  The business defendant can continue to 
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operate, and receive earnings from, the realty and personalty during the appeal.  As owner 
of the real and personal property, the business litigant ought to have the right to choose the 
numerosity and the kinds of security interests that it will use in order to supersede a 
judgment, without interference from a judgment creditor, another litigant, or the trial court 
utilizing its discretion over the matter.] 
(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a judgment is 
for money, the amount of security must not exceed the lesser of: 
(a) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or 
(b) $25 million. 
(c)(2) When a judgment is for money, the judgment amount must be 
deemed an accounting liability for purposes of determining the 
judgment debtor’s net worth under the formula of net worth equals 
total assets less total liabilities, even if the judgment debtor’s net 
worth becomes zero or a negative value. 
[This is a renumbering and renaming to “(c)” to make room for the new subsection (b).  
Also, abiding by GAAP accounting, subsection (c)(2) provides that a civil judgment 
liability constitutes an actual liability for purposes of calculating net worth, even when the 
net-worth formula produces zero or a negative number by including the judgment as a 
liability.] 
(d) On a showing by the judgment debtor that the judgment debtor is likely 
to suffer substantial economic harm if required to post security in an amount 
required under subsection (a) or (c), the trial court shall lower the amount 
of the security to an amount that will not cause the judgment debtor 
substantial economic harm. 
[This renaming to “(d)” makes room for the new subsection (b).] 
(e)(1) An appellate court may review the amount of security as allowed 
under Rule 24, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that when a 
judgment is for money, the appellate court may not modify the amount of 
security to exceed the amount allowed under this section. 
(e)(2) When a judgment is for money, following any intermediate 
court’s decision or action that lowers the judgment amount that the 
trial court used to set security, the judgment debtor has a right when 
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further review is sought in the Texas Supreme Court or the United 
States Supreme Court to a redetermination of the amount of security 
required to supersede the judgment under this section or under 
Rule 24, regardless of whether the appellate court issues a mandate 
and whether the appellate proceedings are completed. 
[This is a renumbering and renaming to “(e)” to make room for the new subsection (b).  
Presently, a judgment debtor must supersede a judgment as it existed before any appellate 
court’s decision or action reducing the judgment – until the appellate court issues a mandate 
to the trial court under Rule of Appellate Procedure 18 or the entire appeal has concluded.  
Subsection (e)(2) enables a judgment debtor to seek a redetermination of the security 
amount in light of a reduction on appeal – which may be continuing – without having to 
wait months or years for the mandate or appellate conclusion.] 
(f) Nothing in this section prevents a trial court from enjoining the 
judgment debtor from dissipating or transferring assets to avoid satisfaction 
of the judgment, but the trial court may not make any order that interferes 
with the judgment debtor’s use, transfer, conveyance, or dissipation of assets 
in the normal course of business. 
[This is a renaming to “(f)” to make room for the new subsection (b).] 
(g) When a judgment is for money, the judgment debtor has a right 
to the subordination of, or the removal of, any judgment liens filed 
under Property Code chapter 52 or other applicable law, in the event 
the judgment debtor seeks to use real estate holdings to supersede the 
judgment, whether in a sales transaction to raise a cash deposit, as 
collateral for a bond, or otherwise. 
[Subsection (g) gives a judgment debtor seeking to supersede a judgment an absolute right 
to use real estate holdings in a sale to raise cash proceeds, or as collateral for a supersedeas 
bond, despite pending judgment liens, such as abstracts of judgment.  The judgment debtor 
would not have to ask a trial court to use its discretion to lift, subordinate, or release the 
liens.] 
Below are the proposed amendments without highlighting or 
explanations. 
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Sec. 52.006.  AMOUNT OF SECURITY FOR MONEY JUDGMENT.  (a)  
Subject to subsection (c), when a judgment is for money, the amount of 
security must equal the sum of: 
(1) the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the judgment before 
the appeal or, pursuant to subsection (e)(2), as revised by appellate action 
before mandate; 
(2) interest for the estimated duration of the appeal; and 
(3) costs awarded in the judgment before the appeal or, pursuant to 
subsection (e)(2), as revised by appellate action before mandate. 
(b)(1) The judgment debtor has a right to supersede a judgment by means 
of: 
(a) filing with the trial court clerk a written agreement with the judgment 
creditor for suspending enforcement of the judgment; 
(b) filing with the trial court clerk a good and sufficient bond; 
(c) making a deposit with the trial court clerk in lieu of a bond; or 
(d) providing alternate security in favor of the judgment creditor. 
(b)(2)(a) Alternate security may consist of a mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or 
other instrument creating security interests in the judgment creditor’s favor 
under Chapters 51 or 64 of the Property Code, or under other applicable 
law, on the judgment debtor’s real estate holdings to the extent those assets 
are unencumbered, including land, commercial or residential buildings, rents 
from real property, oil and gas working interests, oil and gas royalty interests, 
mineral-ownership rights, and other real estate assets, following a valuation 
appraisal of the same by a qualified professional.   
(b)(2)(b) Alternate security may consist of a security interest in the judgment 
creditor’s favor under Chapters 1 or 9 of the Business and Commerce Code, 
or under other applicable law, on the judgment debtor’s personal property 
to the extent those assets are unencumbered, including livestock, crops, 
inventories, accounts, instruments, fixtures, equipment, oil and gas 
production held in storage or in transit, registered or unregistered securities, 
jewelry, and other personalty, following a valuation appraisal of the same by 
a qualified professional.   
(b)(2)(c) During the appeal, the judgment debtor will continue to manage 
and use the real estate holdings and personalty that is being used as alternate 
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security.  The judgment debtor will receive any earnings from the real estate 
holdings and personalty that is being used as alternate security. 
(b)(2)(d) The judgment debtor has a right to elect to use as many or as few 
security interests as it chooses, in whichever form it chooses, in order to 
supersede a judgment by using alternate security. 
(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a judgment is 
for money, the amount of security must not exceed the lesser of: 
(a) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or 
(b) $25 million. 
(c)(2) When a judgment is for money, the judgment amount must be 
deemed an accounting liability for purposes of determining the judgment 
debtor’s net worth under the formula of net worth equals total assets less 
total liabilities, even if the judgment debtor’s net worth becomes zero or a 
negative value. 
(d) On a showing by the judgment debtor that the judgment debtor is likely 
to suffer substantial economic harm if required to post security in an amount 
required under subsection (a) or (c), the trial court shall lower the amount 
of the security to an amount that will not cause the judgment debtor 
substantial economic harm. 
(e)(1) An appellate court may review the amount of security as allowed 
under Rule 24, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that when a 
judgment is for money, the appellate court may not modify the amount of 
security to exceed the amount allowed under this section. 
(e)(2) When a judgment is for money, following any intermediate appellate 
court’s decision or action that lowers the judgment amount that the trial 
court used to set security, the judgment debtor has a right when further 
review is sought in the Texas Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court to a redetermination of the amount of security required to supersede 
the judgment under this section or under Rule 24, regardless of whether the 
appellate court issues a mandate and whether the appellate proceedings are 
completed. 
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(f) Nothing in this section prevents a trial court from enjoining the judgment 
debtor from dissipating or transferring assets to avoid satisfaction of the 
judgment, but the trial court may not make any order that interferes with 
the judgment debtor’s use, transfer, conveyance, or dissipation of assets in 
the normal course of business. 
(g) When a judgment is for money, the judgment debtor has a right to the 
subordination of, or the removal of, any judgment liens filed under 
Chapter 52, Property Code or other applicable law, in the event the 
judgment debtor seeks to use real estate holdings to supersede the judgment, 
whether in a sales transaction to raise a cash deposit, as collateral for a bond, 
or otherwise. 
V.    A RETROSPECTIVE, AND CONCLUSIONS FOR IMPROVING 
TEXAS SUPERSEDEAS LAWS 
In 1985, in a meager Harris County courtroom, the Pennzoil Company, 
an oil company based in Texas, obtained a $10.53 billion verdict against 
Texaco, Inc., despite its name, an oil company based in New York.151  The 
trial court promptly rendered a $10.53 billion judgment, which imposed on 
judgment debtor Texaco a staggering $3 million in post-judgment interest 
per day.152 
That Texaco had tortiously interfered with Pennzoil’s “contract” to buy 
equitable securities from J. Paul Getty entities153—and that Texaco 
 
151. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); COLL, supra 
note 2, at 470. 
152. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); 
COLL, supra note 2, at 473. 
153. See COLL, supra note 2, at 473 (describing Getty Oil’s investment banker’s view on the 
“contract” with Pennzoil: “all of the Wall Street experts involved in the deal, including those 
representing Pennzoil, knew—or should have known—that an ‘agreement in principle’ was nothing 
more than an agreement to agree, and that in practical terms it represented an invitation to outsiders 
to bid for the company [Getty Oil]”); Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1030 (1992) (describing Texaco v. Pennzoil’s scenario that “Texaco was 
accused of having tortiously interfered with a contract that allegedly existed between the Getty 
Foundation and Pennzoil” as an example of “the more neglected problem of the overenforcement of 
promises”); Timothy S. Feltham, Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations: The Texaco Inc. v. 
Pennzoil Co. Litigation, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111, 143–44 (1988) (criticizing Texaco v. Pennzoil’s 
result because the Houston Court of Appeals improperly gave full protection not to a binding contract, 
but to an agreement in principle); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in 
Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (1993) (“The Texaco v. Pennzoil court 
did not take into account the tentative nature of the relationship between Pennzoil and Getty, but 
instead protected it as if it were a binding, unalterable contract.”). 
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consequently owed billions in damages to Pennzoil154—were monumental 
legal questions worthy of the most exacting appellate scrutiny.  The years 
following trial did not see that exacting appellate scrutiny.  In 1987, the 
Houston Court of Appeals mostly affirmed the judgment,155 the Texas 
Supreme Court oddly refused to review the case, and, despite their concerns 
for Texaco and for rational process, the federal courts could not relieve 
Texaco as judgment debtor of the judgment’s effects—such as by enjoining 
Pennzoil’s judgment-execution efforts.156  By 1988, Texaco had filed for 
bankruptcy protection.  The case settled shortly thereafter.157  Texaco paid 
Pennzoil $3 billion in order to emerge from bankruptcy.158 
Historically speaking, Texaco v. Pennzoil remains our civil justice system’s 
greatest folly and embarrassment.  From the case’s suspect trial proceedings 
 
154. Awarding Pennzoil $7.5 billion in compensatory damages because it lost the opportunity 
to buy—that is, painfully buy via billions in cash reserves and financing—an interest in Getty Oil for 
roughly $9 billion made no sense.  This damages model necessarily, and patently, went far beyond 
making Pennzoil whole on the transaction, and it defied substantive-law standards.  See generally Robert 
M. Lloyd, Pennzoil v. Texaco, Twenty Years After: Lessons for Business Lawyers, 6 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 321, 346 (2005) (“While Pennzoil’s [damages] theory was simple and seemingly logical, it was 
totally bogus.  If Getty Oil was really that valuable, why was Texaco able to get it by paying only 10% 
more than Pennzoil was offering?  Were all the large oil companies in the world (or for that matter all 
the large companies and rich individuals who had the wherewithal to put together a big deal) so stupid 
that they didn’t know how valuable Getty was?  Were they really so stupid they couldn’t read the reports 
and do the math that the jury was being asked to do?  The answer, of course, is that things weren’t as 
simple as Pennzoil’s argument made out.”); KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: HOW 
CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 133 (1992) (describing 
Pennzoil’s damage theory as “a strange way to calculate the damages”). 
155. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (eliminating $2 billion in punitive damages and thereby affirming a judgment of 
$8.53 billion). 
156. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987) (disallowing an injunction against 
Pennzoil’s judgment-collection efforts, which the Second Circuit had upheld, by concluding “the lower 
courts should have deferred on principles of comity to the pending [Texas] state proceedings”). 
157. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 748 S.W.2d 631, 631–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1988) (per curiam) (noting “[t]he Texas Supreme Court refused, n.r.e., appellant Texaco’s application 
for writ of error on November 2, 1987.  On April 12, 1987, Texaco filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy laws. . . . [T]he parties state that the judgment of the 
151st District Court, which  was affirmed in part and reversed in part by this Court, has been fully and 
finally settled, which settlement was approved by the bankruptcy court . . . ”). 
158. Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: 
Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295, 298 (1989). 
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and backdrop,159 its suspect appellate review160 and appellate politics,161 
and its legendary supersedeas struggles162 arose the academic work 
 
159. COLL, supra note 2, at 413–14, 434–35, 441–42, 449 (surveying examples of regional and 
cultural prejudices against Texaco’s witnesses, as shown by Pennzoil’s trial lawyers and the trial court 
itself); Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667, 676 n.32 
(2001) (discussing events before the initial trial judge’s departure for health reasons in that “[t]wo days 
after Judge Anthony Farris was assigned to hear the case of Texaco v. Pennzoil, Joe Jamail, Pennzoil’s 
lead counsel at the time, donated $10,000 to Judge Farris’ re-election campaign and another $10,000 to 
the campaign of the administrative judge with supervisory powers over Judge Farris. . . .  Texaco’s 
motion to recuse Judge Farris on the basis of the contribution was denied”) (citations omitted); J. Caleb 
Rackley, A Survey of Sea-Change on The Supreme Court of Texas and Its Turbulent Toll on Texas Tort Law, 48 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 733, 778 (2007) (“To make matters more suspect, when Farris had to step down from 
the case over half-way through for health reasons, Solomon Casseb Jr. was chosen to replace him.  
Casseb was ‘a boyhood friend of Jamail’s,’ and his ‘charge to the jury, in which the word ‘agreement’ 
was used instead of ‘contract’ was a key point in Texaco’s eventual appeal.” (quoting Janet Elliott, 
Pennzoil Versus Texaco: Ten Years Later, Lasting Impact or Legal Anomaly? A Look Back at the Real Trial of the 
Century, TEX. LAW., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1, 18–19)). 
160. The Houston Court of Appeals’ opinion on the trial proceedings is thorough, approaching 
100 pages in length.  Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).  But the opinion is inadequate because it relies on a press release, Wall Street 
Journal articles, and business discussions in an exceedingly short time period—from just January 3 to 6, 
1984—to conclude that Pennzoil had a binding contract with J. Paul Getty entities to buy an interest 
in Getty Oil.  Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d at 784–86, 799–802.  Consequently, many commentators have 
observed that, at best, Pennzoil had only an agreement to keep negotiating towards a contract—and 
not a binding contract.  See supra note 153.  Moreover, the opinion heavily discounts that many Getty 
entities were actively seeking other proposals and, thus, were showing their inclination to reject 
Pennzoil’s proposal regardless of Texaco’s conduct.  Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d at 786, 799.  These facts 
condemn the notion that Texaco’s conduct caused Pennzoil to breach the alleged contract.  See generally 
Int’l Bureau for Prot. & Investigation, Ltd. v. Pub. Serv. Emps. Union, 413 N.Y.S.2d 962, 969 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (listing, under New York law (the law underlying the Texaco v. Pennzoil case), 
“defendant’s intentional procurement of the breach of [] contract” as an element of tortious interference 
under that law) (emphasis added).  The opinion disregards Texaco’s direct evidence that it lacked 
knowledge of any contract between Pennzoil and the Getty entities.  Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d at 798, 
800.  The opinion allows an outlandish damages model that flaunts common sense.  Id. at 831, 835; see 
generally supra note 154. 
In sum, no Texas practitioner with experience in legal-sufficiency review—as it exists in Texas 
today—could argue with conviction that the judgment in Texaco v. Pennzoil would survive scrutiny in 
any existing Texas appellate court. 
161. See J. David Rowe, Limited Term Merit Appointments: A Proposal to Reform Judicial Selection, 
2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 335, 345 (1995) (“The resulting corruption fostered by judicial campaign 
contributions is obvious.  In the now infamous Pennzoil v. Texaco case, for example: ‘Texaco 
representatives contributed campaign funds totaling $72,700 to seven justices [of the Texas Supreme 
Court] while an appeal in the $11 billion Pennzoil lawsuit against Texaco was pending before the court. 
Pennzoil lawyers countered, contributing $315,000 to their campaigns.  Further, four justices who 
received contributions from the parties did not even face re-election.”’ (quoting Madison B. McClellan, 
Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer’s Guide to Judicial Selection in Florida, 43 FLA. 
L. REV. 529, 555(1991))). 
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product,163 the legislative action,164 and the heightened appellate scrutiny 
that presently shape trial-court and appellate proceedings in Texas.  By way 
of many reforms, Texas’s civil justice system has improved markedly 
since—and directly as a result of —Texaco v. Pennzoil.  Among the reforms 
were the 1988 legislative amendments to procedural supersedeas laws, and 
the 2003 refinements thereof. 
The 2003 refinements, which culminated in the statute and the procedural 
rule, have protected businesses and businesspeople from the nightmarish 
scenario faced by Texaco.  But the statute and the procedural rule are 
inadequate still.  They do not protect those businesses and businesspeople 
that need to appeal a judgment—but that cannot post as security the 
 
162. A good description of Texaco’s supersedeas predicament appears in the Second Circuit’s 
opinion upholding a federal court’s injunction against Pennzoil’s judgment-collection efforts.  The 
description calls to mind this paper’s explanation (in Part II.A supra) of a judgment debtor’s inability to 
obtain a supersedeas bond (or cash deposit in lieu of bond) when facing a judgment well in excess of 
the debtor’s unencumbered assets.  See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(“Texaco would, absent injunctive relief, again face a financial crisis of staggering proportions, which 
could not under Texas law be avoided without Pennzoil’s consent. . . .  Texaco, in order to stay 
execution of the judgment against it pending its appeal, [must under Texas law] post a supersedeas 
bond, payable to Pennzoil, ‘in at least the amount of judgment, interest and costs,’ to the text of the 
note or more than $12 billion since interest accumulates at the rate of approximately $3 million per 
day. . . .  Needless to say, Texaco could not possibly meet the mandatory bond requirement.  It is 
estimated that the world-wide surety bond capacity ranges from $1 billion to $1.5 billion under the best 
possible circumstances.  In addition, full collateralization would be required for a bond of such huge 
proportions.  Texaco does not have sufficient liquid or immediately-liquidatable assets to post 
$12 billion in cash or cash equivalents and still retain sufficient liquid assets to operate its business.”), 
rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
163. See Carlson, supra note 3, at 59–61 (arguing the requirement of a supersedeas bond violates 
the open courts provision in the Texas Constitution because taking a party’s property before it can 
appeal denies meaningful court access); John T. Montford & Will G. Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: 
The Quest for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 59, 66–78 (1988) 
(surveying many broad initiatives to improve Texas’s civil justice system); Douglas Laycock, International 
Litigation Symposium Honoring the Distinguished Career of Professor Russell J. Weintraub: Introduction, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2003) (noting comments by Russell Weintraub, a distinguished professor at the 
University of Texas Law School: “If you shopped for law in Bedlam, you would expect to find a ‘tort’ 
of interference with contract that could be committed by making a better offer [namely, Texaco’s 
conduct].” (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, The Ten Billion Dollar Jury’s Standards for Determining Intention to 
Contract: Pennzoil v. Texaco, 9 REV. LITIG. 371, 373 n.6 (1990)). 
164. In re Longview Energy Co., 464 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (“In the 
wake of Texaco v. Pennzoil, the Legislature re-entered the realm of supersedeas, enacting Chapter 52 of 
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” (citing Act of June 16, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1178, § 1, 1989 
Tex. Gen. Laws 4813, 4813–14, repealed in part by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 204, § 7.03, 
2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 863 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 52.001, 
52.005–.006))); see Carlson, supra note 8, at 1037–38, 1069 (commenting on the 1988 amendments to 
supersedeas laws resulting from Texaco v. Pennzoil). 
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judgment amount, one-half of net worth, or $25 million.  Clearly, the 2003 
reforms would have helped Texaco, a publicly-traded company that eagerly 
would have deposited $25 million in order to stave off Pennzoil’s judgment-
collection efforts.  Moreover, the 2003 reforms have helped many large 
business litigants similar to Texaco by means of the $25 million supersedeas 
cap.  The 2003 reforms, however, have failed to help the smaller 
businessmen in Hardwick, Ghani, and Stephens because these judgment 
debtors could not readily post the judgment amount, one-half of net worth, 
or $25 million.  Contrasting their numbers against each other, as between 
the smaller and the larger business litigant, Texas sees many more business 
litigants having the size of those in Hardwick, Ghani, and Stephens than those 
having the size of Texaco.  Therefore, the statute and the procedural rule 
potentially fail the majority of business litigants needing to appeal a 
judgment. 
As did Texaco, must these smaller business litigants suffer bankruptcies 
and financial ruin in order to inspire supersedeas reform?  (They should not 
have to.)  Are they sufficiently high-profile to catch the Texas Legislature’s 
attention in a future session?  (They should be.) 
The business litigants in Hardwick, Ghani, and Stephens are typically 
Texan—and the oilmen in Hardwick and Stephens are quintessentially so.  
These litigants have much more in the way of non-liquid assets (e.g., land, 
buildings, oil and gas interests, and ownerships in closely held companies) 
than they have of liquid assets (e.g., cash, stocks, and bonds).  The litigants 
in Hardwick and Stephens are especially “land rich, cash poor,” owning 
primarily farmland and oil and gas interests.  As a general rule, such business 
litigants cannot convert their assets to cash by way of prompt sales or 
exchanges, and they cannot obtain sufficient bank support to induce a surety 
to post a supersedeas bond.  Without the ability to post a cash deposit or 
supersedeas bond, they must request some form of alternate security from 
the trial court—which has broad discretion to turn down their requests.  
Once turned down by the trial court, their challenges to trial-court discretion 
on appeal are fraught with expense and uncertainty. 
Texas law can and should do better for the majority of business litigants 
that might face a daunting money judgment while needing to pursue an 
appeal.  And, Texas law can protect their interests while still protecting 
judgment creditors, especially by allowing for “alternate security” as a matter 
of right. 
First, this paper’s most substantial argument has advanced that Texas law 
must recognize judgment liabilities as balance-sheet liabilities, just as 
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accounting professionals adhering to GAAP would do.  Whether labeled as 
a “contingent” liability or a “certain” liability, a judgment liability on the 
cusp of enforcement has the hallmarks of an accounting “liability”; the 
judgment is “a present duty or responsibility” for the judgment debtor, 
leaving “little to no discretion” to avoid payment or other satisfaction, on 
transactions (i.e., the litigation events) that have “already happened.”165  
Allowing a trial or appellate court to keep the liability off the balance sheet 
because it is too remote or contingent, while allowing the judgment to wreck 
a judgment debtor’s financial wherewithal leads to an absurd and tragic 
scenario.  If Texas ceases to use GAAP as the standard for determining a 
judgment debtor’s net worth, then the legislature or courts may use special 
definitions for “net worth” and may pick and choose the assets and liabilities 
for making the determination.  Until such time, however, Texas should 
include a judgment liability on a judgment debtor’s balance sheet, thereby 
reducing (or even eliminating) net worth for purposes of the statute 
(i.e., 52.006(b)(1)) and the procedural rule (i.e., 24.1(a)(1)(A)).  Doing so will 
align Texas law with GAAP and will significantly aid judgment debtors like 
those in Hardwick, Ghani, and Stephens.  Doing so will encourage plaintiffs, 
which might become judgment creditors needing judgment security, to think 
carefully and efficiently about how many claims or damages theories they 
pursue in the trial court.  Under this paper’s first reform, loading up a 
defendant (judgment debtor) with excessive damages liability in the trial 
court will negatively impact a judgment creditor’s ability to obtain judgment 
security—and that is a good and welcome thing. 
Second, Texas law must grant a judgment debtor the right to post 
“alternate security,” rather than leaving the matter to the trial court’s 
discretion.  Alternate security greatly benefits both judgment debtors and 
creditors and, for cases like Hardwick, Ghani, and Stephens, is superior to 
supersedeas bonds or cash deposits in lieu of bonds.  Granting a right to 
alternate security will avoid the sizeable transactional costs that judgment 
debtors must incur when they seek to obtain a bond (namely, the bank’s and 
surety’s fees and premiums) and when they seek to raise a cash deposit 
(namely, the consequences of hastily selling land or closely held assets).  The 
debtors preserve resources for the appeal, for regular business, and for 
ultimate collection by the creditor if the creditor prevails on appeal. 
Third, Texas law must enable judgment debtors to lower their 
supersedeas burdens during an appeal to the Texas or United States 
 
165. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, supra note 101, para. 36. at CON6-13. 
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Supreme Courts when a decision by an intermediate appellate court has 
reduced the judgment liability.  Even if this reform becomes a “two-way 
street,” so that judgment creditors may increase the supersedeas burdens in 
the contrary scenario, the reform on average will benefit debtors more than 
creditors, and this paper’s other reforms would still sufficiently protect the 
judgment debtors. 
Fourth, Texas law must enable judgment debtors to subordinate or 
remove any and all judgment-related liens hindering their real estate’s use in 
a sale for cash or as collateral for a bond.  The statute and the procedural 
rule presently do not entitle judgment creditors to any greater protection 
than a cash deposit or bond; therefore, this particular reform merely enables 
judgment debtors to supply judgment creditors with their greatest security 
rights.  Judgment creditors, therefore, suffer no diminution in rights under 
this reform. 
Texans do not easily give up their fighting against perceived injustice; 
when in litigation, this principle plays out perforce.  When a Texas business 
litigant has become a judgment debtor after a lengthy, expensive, and hard-
fought trial court proceeding, the litigant likely will appeal the judgment and, 
accordingly, will need to supersede the judgment.  Facing supersedeas 
difficulties, most Texas business litigants will not settle a case, but rather will 
fight a war on two fronts: appealing the case for a review of the merits, while 
staving off judgment-collection efforts.  The current supersedeas laws—by 
leaving limited rights to smaller, hard-fighting judgment debtors—engender 
wasteful satellite litigation and strife, benefit no one (other than plaintiff’s 
attorneys seeking to coerce a settlement), and leave judgment debtors subject 
to “shakedowns” in Texas courtrooms, as Texaco notoriously experienced 
in the late-1980s.  The four reforms discussed in this paper—individually and 
collectively—seek to alleviate the foregoing state of affairs.  May Texas 
legislators and courts take heed. 
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